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INTRODUCTION 
A plaintiff beginning a lawsuit has a hero’s journey1 ahead of her, replete 
with challenges, as she strives to present a compelling narrative to a deci-
sionmaker, one that will demonstrate her entitlement to relief under the relevant 
law. In recent years, this journey has become more difficult due to the rise of 
what is best described as “narrative-erasing procedure” in civil pretrial litiga-
tion.2 For instance, the Supreme Court has imposed the heightened “plausibil-
ity” pleading standard she must surpass to survive the motion to dismiss.3 If she 
makes it past the plausibility hurdle to discovery, the plaintiff may request rele-
vant information—but only insofar as it is “proportional to the needs of” her 
case.4 Before she can tell her story, she may be swept up in the wave of high 
rates of settlement.5 Her likelihood of reaching a merits determination in her 
case is very low.6 And her quest will be especially challenging if she is assert-
ing a civil rights claim or asserting she was subject to unlawful discrimination.7 
These trends in civil procedure have been debated in the literature.8 Yet 
that debate has ignored the effect of pretrial procedure on the values that narra-
                                                        
 1  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER VOGLER, THE WRITER’S JOURNEY: MYTHIC STRUCTURE FOR 
WRITERS 7 (Paul Norlen ed., 3d ed. 2007) (describing the hero’s story). 
 2  By using the term “narrative-erasing procedure,” I intend to call to mind Marc S. Ga-
lanter’s The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459–60 (2004) and Brooke D. Coleman’s 
The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 503 (2012). However, rather than 
simply declare narratives are vanishing, I want to highlight that procedure is responsible for 
narratives’ erasure. In using “narrative-erasing procedure,” I am also referencing the work of 
Peter Brooks, who described law as keeping its narrativity “under erasure.” Peter Brooks, 
Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 21 
(2006). 
3  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555–56, 560 (2007). 
4   FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). See also U.S. SUPREME COURT, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6–7 (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015 
year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8LN-UF7V] (describing changes to Rule 26(b)(1)). 
5   Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1953 
(2009). 
6   See id. at 1956 (“As nontrial terminations of various sorts have increased, the civil trial has 
all but disappeared.”). See also Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, 
Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/ 
jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-doors.html [https://perma.cc/J9VQ-ZP 
ZQ] (“The national decline in trials, both criminal and civil, has been noted in law journal 
articles, bar association studies and judicial opinions.”). 
7   See Coleman, supra note 2, at 503 (“[T]he price of a restrictive shift in procedural doctrine 
is that it marginalizes particular claims, and by extension, particular people.”). 
8   See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 353, 353–54 (2010). See also Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2014) (describing “how restrictions on courthouse access and other 
changes have reshaped the nature of litigation in the federal courts”). 
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tive supports in civil litigation. Narrative is central to the proper functioning of 
the civil litigation system, including in litigation prior to trial: the law produces 
narratives, narratives grow the law, and narrative ensures the participation of 
citizens in the democratic operation of litigation. This article argues that the 
narratives generated in pretrial litigation, which are understudied, have deep 
importance to civil litigation’s democratic value. 
Narrative-erasing procedure endangers the civil litigation system by silenc-
ing litigants’ voices and depriving the law of the stories it needs to progress. 
Narrative-erasing procedure also has a particularly harsh impact on individuals 
who are already marginalized in society. Ultimately, narrative-erasing proce-
dure threatens the quality of justice. As this article explains, we need narrative 
for the law to address longstanding problems and for it to develop in constant-
ly-changing times. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an essential primer on 
narrative theory, including the way narrative functions in law, to ground my ac-
count of the dangers of narrative-erasing procedure. Part II then illustrates the 
importance of narrative to pretrial litigation, by providing a detailed account of 
the presence and value of narratives in the civil pretrial system. In Part III, the 
article addresses narrative erasing procedural devices, by locating three proce-
dural hurdles that threaten narratives, and by studying the impact of this narra-
tive erasure on pretrial litigation. Finally, in Part IV, I recommend solutions for 
the problems narrative-erasing procedure causes, including policy recommen-
dations for courts and rule-makers to better account for the value of narrative, 
and tools for lawyers and legal scholars to introduce narrative by other means, 
drawing on Marshall Ganz’s work on “public narrative” in the social move-
ments literature.  
I. NARRATIVE THEORY FOR LAWYERS 
Because of narrative’s importance to law and to pretrial procedure, and be-
cause of narrative-erasing procedure’s dangers, it is imperative for the law to 
pay attention to narrative. Narrative ought to be a familiar subject to legal 
scholars and lawyers, because law and narrative are inextricably linked and the 
study of narrative offers helpful insights for the study of law.9 Too often, 
though, legal training and legal scholarship ignore law’s narrative content, sim-
plify law and narrative to a set of practical instructions, and otherwise relegate 
law-and-narrative studies to a distant corner of the legal academy.10 We cannot 
                                                        
9   See ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY & LAW 345 (1993); see also Brooks, supra note 
2, at 3 (“[I]f the ways stories are told, and are judged to be told, makes a difference in the 
law, why doesn’t the law pay more attention to narratives, to narrative analysis and even nar-
rative theory?”). 
10   See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Literature as Law’s Other, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 349, 360 
(2010) (“Trial lawyers know that they need to tell stories—that the evidence they present in 
court must be bound together and unfolded in narrative form. . . . Yet the law rarely speaks 
in a doctrinal or analytic way about its narrative dimension.”). 
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reckon with narrative-erasing procedure without a robust understanding of what 
narrative means and how it works. We also need an understanding of the wis-
dom narrative theory has to share about persuasion and possibility in law.  
A. Defining Narrative: More Than Just a Good Story 
For a profession that constantly utilizes narratives, the legal profession has 
a limited understanding of the meaning of the term “narrative.”11 The term 
“narrative” is misused and overused in legal scholarship.12 Although lawyers 
use narrative in many aspects of their practice, and although legal scholars use 
the term “narrative” with some frequency, the academic definition of narrative 
is poorly understood in law.  
James Phelan’s definition of narrative is notable for its simplicity and uni-
versality: “[S]omebody telling somebody else on some occasion and for some 
purpose(s) that something happened.”13 Phelan’s definition should resonate 
with lawyers for its references to purpose and audience, both central considera-
tions for legal writers.14  
While Phelan’s definition captures the important aspects of narrative, it 
may be deceptively simple for legally-trained readers used to complicated defi-
nitions, so I offer another definition: “[T]he representation of an event or a se-
ries of events.”15 
The word “representation” leads to a significant point: lawyers may find 
themselves tripped up in confusion over the difference between “narrative” and 
“story.” A narrative is the representation of the events that occur in a story (the 
story-events). Most English speakers are familiar with using the term “story” to 
mean what this article refers to as “narrative.”16  
                                                        
11   Law has an uneasy relationship with narrative: Rather than acknowledge its debt to narra-
tive, law as a discipline “wants to believe that it is rooted in irrefutable principles and that it 
proceeds by its own special methodology.” Brooks, supra note 2, at 20. 
12   See, e.g., Simon Stern, Narrative in the Legal Text: Judicial Opinions and Their Narra-
tives, in NARRATIVE AND METAPHOR IN LAW 5 (Michael Hanne & Robert Weisberg eds., 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2830904 [https://perma.cc/Y9 
P9-LLCP] (“[L]egal scholars often speak of ‘narratives’ when they mean something else. . . . 
Frequently, the label means simply that an interpretation is about to follow . . .”). 
13   James Phelan, Narratives in Contest; or, Another Twist in the Narrative Turn, 123 
PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE ASS’N 166, 167 (2008). 
14   See ALEXA Z. CHEW & KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL, THE COMPLETE LEGAL WRITER 6–7 
(2016) (encouraging legal writing students to consider the audience—“any possible reader of 
your legal document”—and purpose—“the task that the document is meant to complete”—
when writing a legal document). 
15   H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 12 (2008). For yet 
another definition of narrative, see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING 
THE LAW 113 (2000). 
16  ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 16–17. As Abbott explains, “[m]ost speakers of English grow 
up using story to mean what [narrative theorists] . . . refer[] to . . . as narrative. . . . [T]he dis-
tinction between story and narrative discourse is vital for an understanding of how narrative 
works.” Id. at 18. 
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When this article uses the term narrative, it refers to a particular representa-
tion of a series of events: a text or other embodiment of a certain telling or 
treatment of a story’s events. (Note that a narrative does not have to be a writ-
ten language text—though it often is, of course.) “Story” on the other hand, 
means the “action”—it is the “event or sequence of events” that will be repre-
sented. 17 The narrative is the representation of those events.18  
The representation of story in narrative is flexible; “narrative discourse is 
infinitely malleable.”19 For instance, to use a well-known example of the varie-
ty of narratives that can be created out of a series of events or happenings, con-
sider Birmingham, Alabama on the days around Easter 1963.20 The events are 
recounted in a number of different narratives, including the Supreme Court’s 
opinions in Walker v. City of Birmingham21 and Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham.22 Walker’s majority opinion, authored by Justice Stewart, and its dis-
sent authored by Justice Brennan create different narratives out of the same un-
derlying events; the majority opinion in Shuttlesworth, authored by Justice 
Stewart, presents yet another narrative.23 The opinions in Walker and Shut-
tlesworth demonstrate how the same story-events can be represented in differ-
ent narratives, or, in Phelan’s terms, how narratives are told on different occa-
sions for different purposes: to explain and justify the results in two separate 
cases.24 Thus, “story” is indeed a component of studying narrative, but the con-
cept of story is different from the narrative that emerges from the act of narra-
tion.25  
                                                        
17   Id. at 19. 
18  Id. 
19   Id. at 17. 
20   For a thorough discussion of the historical events described here, see David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Intro-
duction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 645–46 (1995). 
21   Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 308–09 (1967). 
22   Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 148–49 (1969). 
23   For insightful discussions of the different narratives that emerged in the court opinions, 
see Julie M. Spanbauer, Teaching First-Semester Students that Objective Analysis Per-
suades, 5 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 167, 178–85 (1999); see also Shaun B. Spencer, Dr. King, 
Bull Connor, and Persuasive Narratives, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 209, 209 
(2004). 
24   For instance, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Walker created a narrative that gave the march-
ers “human, sympathetic faces.” Spencer, supra note 23, at 214 (citing Walker, 388 U.S. at 
338 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in Walker has no such clear 
protagonist. Id.; see also Spanbauer, supra note 23, at 182 (“[T]he marchers [that] appear in 
the Walker account [are described] as aggressive, disorderly, and dangerous[.]”). However, 
by the time Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion in Shuttlesworth, the marchers are 
characterized as an “organized group with defined leadership. They have, in just two years, 
become orderly, reasonable. . . .” Id. By emphasizing different facts and eliding some details 
altogether, the opinions created different narratives. See id. 
25   ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 17–20. See also Brooks, supra note 2, at 24. Other scholars use 
the Russian structuralist terms of the fabula (the underlying story) and the szujet (the treat-
ment of the story in the narrative). ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 18. The narrative discourse and 
the story combine into the narrative. Id. 
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The events that make up the story told in the narrative also deserve consid-
eration. Scholars of narrative classify the events of a story according to relative 
importance.26 Constituent events “are necessary for the story to be the story it 
is. They are the turning points, the events that drive the story forward and that 
lead to other events.”27 Supplementary events, on the other hand, do not “drive 
the story forward”: they “are [not] necessary for the story. . . .”28 Some events 
may themselves be micro-narratives, which provide “the building blocks out of 
which all the more complex [narrative] forms are built.”29  
B. Insights from Narrative Theory 
Just as there is a difference between narrative and story, there is a differ-
ence between the storytelling and the field of narrative theory.30 While the le-
gally-trained reader may regard “narrative theory” as the practice of thinking 
about how to tell a client’s story most convincingly, there is more to the field: 
narrative theory is a rich field of study about the nature, composition, and pow-
er of narratives.31 
Narrative theory offers important insights for the study of law. For the pur-
poses of this article, two insights are especially important: First, narrative theo-
ry provides a compelling explanation of the reason narrative is so powerful. Se-
cond, narrative theory provides a useful way to think about the inherently 
contestable nature of narrative.  
1. Why is Narrative So Powerful? 
Narrative is vital to human life, because narrative is how we make sense of 
the world.32 Indeed, Jerome Bruner has written that the very concept of the self 
depends on having a narrative of one’s own life.33  
                                                        
26   ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 22. 
27   Id. (constituent events can also be thought of as “nuclei” or “kernels”). 
28   Id. at 22–23 (supplementary events can also be thought of as “catalyzers” or “satellites”). 
29   Id. at 13. 
30   See, e.g., Christy H. DeSanctis, Narrative Reasoning and Analogy: The Untold Story, 9 
LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 149, 153 (2012) (noting the difference between story-
telling and narrative theory). “ ‘[S]torytelling’ is used to describe the actual practice of tell-
ing stories, and ‘narrative theory’ is used to refer to the nature and process of storytelling at 
a higher level of abstraction.” Id. 
31   See Phelan, supra note 13, at 167. Narrative theory offers a way to look at “individual 
narratives as . . . freestanding formal structures” and as “historically and culturally situated 
entities.” Id. See also Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 14, 17 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (de-
scribing narratology as offering “some hypotheses, distinctions, and analytic methods that 
could be useful to legal scholars, if they were to pay attention”). 
32   See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 1 (“[A]s true as it is that narrative can be an art and 
that art thrives on narrative, narrative is also something we all engage in. . . . We make narra-
tives many times a day, every day of our lives.”); Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A 
Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 282 (2011) (narrative “is 
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Cognitive science has contributed much to our understanding of how narra-
tive shapes the human understanding of the world.34 We understand the world 
through narrative by using “schema.”35 Essentially, a “schema” functions as 
shorthand for an event or series of events that we’ve seen, heard, or experi-
enced before.36 Instead of “schema,” one could think “mental blueprints” or 
“stock structures”.37  
Through schema, we know what it is to see a sunset, take a bus, or order 
food from a drive-through. As long as “the stimuli we encounter falls within 
our pre-conceived expectations, identification is automatic.”38 Our use of 
schema enables us to process what we are doing and predict what will come 
next.39 Without applying schema, cognitive science tells us, we would be forced 
                                                                                                                                 
based on components we unconsciously understand because of our experience in the 
world”); Linda H. Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand? Hamdi, Myth, and the Master’s 
Tools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 51 (2013) (“Human beings are hard-wired to organize the 
world narratively, with abstract reasoning and deductive processes only arising derivatively 
from the preexisting narrative structure.”); Maureen Johnson, You Had Me at Hello: Examin-
ing the Impact of Powerful Introductory Emotional Hooks Set Forth in Appellate Briefs 
Filed in Recent Hotly Contested U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 49 IND. L. REV. 397, 400 
(2016) (noting that humans are “ ‘hard-wired’ for story”). 
33   Jerome Bruner, Life as Narrative, 54 SOC. RES. 11, 11 (1987). Bruner calls narrative “a 
precondition for our collective life in culture”; our collective life would not “be possible 
were it not for our human capacity to organize and communicate experience in a narrative 
form.” JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 16 (2002) (hereinafter 
BRUNER, MAKING STORIES). 
34   Narrative theory has gained a great deal from the field of cognitive science, particularly 
concerning the roles of stories in perception and the relationship between cognition and nar-
rative. See Cognitive Narratology, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NARRATIVE THEORY 67 
(David Herman et al. eds., 2005); David Herman, Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sci-
ences, 11 NARRATIVE INQUIRY 1, 2 (2001) (“[N]arratology, like linguistics, can be recharac-
terized as a subdomain of cognitive-scientific research.”). See also Edwards, supra note 32, 
at 50, 50 n.31 (citing STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 
xi–xvii (2001)). 
35  See Edwards, supra note 32, at 50–51; Johnson, supra note 32, at 407. 
36  Humans use a store of situational and contextual knowledge to integrate their experiences 
into the larger conceptual frameworks. Cognitive Narratology, supra note 34, at 67, 69. The 
terminology applied to this knowledge varies: terms include frames, scripts, and schema. Id. 
at 67. “Frames” tend to cover standard situations (the experience of seeing a tree) while 
“scripts” apply to action sequences (the experience of taking the bus). Id. at 69. This article 
uses “schema” to cover both frames and scripts: the term covers that underlying encoded 
knowledge that we use to make sense of the world. Id. at 67. See also Edwards, supra note 
32, at 50–51 (“A schema functions as a blueprint that organizes people, places, and events 
into roles made familiar by that particular schema.”). 
37   Johnson, supra note 32, at 407. 
38  Id. See also Edwards, supra note 32, at 51 (Once a schema is activated, “[t]he resulting 
cognitive organizations and perceptions seem to the individual as the natural and ‘true’ state 
of affairs. Once within the frame of such a cognitive structure, escape is difficult.”). 
39   See Berger, supra note 32, at 282 (“[N]arrative makes experiences understandable and 
allows us to roughly predict the result.”). 
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to re-learn the world anew every day, which would powerfully limit our ability 
to do anything else.40 
To the extent we share the same underlying schemas as others, we can un-
derstand what others are doing or even thinking.41 The more schemas with 
which we are familiar, the better we are able to understand the world.42  
The power of narrative grows from this cognitive process that relies on 
schema.43 Some schemas or stock structures are actually stories—in other 
words, plots with events that take the shape of a beginning, middle and end—
about the way things happen in our experience or in our culture.44 This process 
of narrative-construction—matching experience to a schema—is automatic; we 
likely do not realize we are doing it.45 
Certain stories enjoy special resonance within particular cultures.46 We 
might call these archetypes, cultural master stories, or master narratives.47 With 
respect to these master narratives, “[w]e carry the blueprints of these archetypal 
situations, and when events activate those archetypes, we create at least the 
rough outlines of a particular mythological story through which we view those 
events.”48 Cultural master narratives exist related to law: for instance, about the 
                                                        
40  Id. at 281. 
41  ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: NARRATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE 7 (Peter Brooks & 
Paul Gerwitz eds., 1990) (“Scripts are useful for understanding the actions of others as long 
as we know the script they are following.”). 
42   Id. at 8 (“The more scripts you know, the more situations will exist in which you feel 
comfortable and capable of playing your role effectively. But the more scripts you know, the 
more situations you will fail to wonder about, be confused by, and have to figure out on your 
own.”). 
43  See Berger, supra note 32, at 279, 281. 
44   See id. at 278 (“If you tell the story well, the listener will expect certain characters and 
plot developments even though other storylines might also explain the same events.”). See 
also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 30–31. 
45   BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 8. 
46   See ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 46–47. The “stories that we tell over and over in myriad 
forms and that connect vitally with our deepest values, wishes, and fears” can be called 
“masterplots.” Id. at 46. “[T]he more culturally specific the masterplot, the greater its practi-
cal force in everyday life. All national cultures have their masterplots, some of which are 
local variations on universal masterplots.” Id. at 47. See also LEE ANNE BELL, STORYTELLING 
FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: CONNECTING NARRATIVE AND THE ARTS IN ANTIRACIST TEACHING 23 
(2010) (“Stock stories are the tales told by the dominant group, passed on through historical 
and literary documents, and celebrated through public rituals, law, the arts, education and 
media. . . . [S]tock stories tell a great deal about what a society considers important and 
meaningful. . . .”); Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narra-
tive to Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 335 
(2012). 
47   ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 47. A masterplot also could be called a “master narrative,” 
“story skeleton,” “canonical story,” or an “archetype.” Id.; see also Wilkins, supra note 46, 
at 335. 
48   Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. 
L. REV. 883, 890 (2010). 
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way law works, or about what causes or cures crime, about how different 
groups of people interact.49  
As Linda Berger has written: “[S]tories embedded in our experience pro-
vide mental blueprints and cognitive shortcuts. . . . Stories also make it easier 
for us to communicate our experiences, help us predict what will happen, and 
sketch out what we will need to do when we find ourselves entangled in a typi-
cal plight.”50 Through those schema, stock stories, or cultural master narratives, 
we use narratives to tell and re-tell our history, our traditions, and our values. 51 
In short, we experience life in narrative. Narrative “allows us to gather [events], 
group them together, . . . [and] place them into a storyline with a beginning and 
end.”52 Without narrative, life wouldn’t make much sense. 53 
As many intuitively know, narrative is powerfully persuasive. Because of 
its order of events, narrative creates a sense of causation in the audience.54 The 
“impression of causation” that narrative creates is a “powerful” way of “sug-
gesting normality”: “Bringing a collection of events into narrative coherence 
can be described as a way of normalizing those events. It renders them plausi-
ble, allowing one to see how they all ‘belong.’ ” 55 
Narrative is powerful because it is natural, inviting, and shared.56 When an 
audience receives a narrative, the audience becomes part of the telling, and may 
use their schema to understand the story or may learn a new way of understand-
ing.57 Thus, narrative can create understanding and enhance identification.58 
Narrative also provokes active thinking and promotes problem solving.59 
Stock stories or master-narratives are particularly persuasive because they 
are enshrined in a culture.60 Master-narratives may seem inflexible, but even 
those stories can be unseated, through telling and re-telling.61  
                                                        
49   See Wilkins, supra note 46, at 336. 
50   Berger, supra note 32, at 281. 
51   See Edwards, supra note 32, at 51 (“Myths and master stories operate widely within cul-
tures to mediate new events and infuse them with shared social meaning[ and] to channel 
other potentially similar events into a well-worn path. The outcome suggested by the myth or 
master story will seem both true and inevitable.”). 
52   Berger, supra note 32, at 275. 
53   See id. at 275. See also ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 11 (“[W]herever we look in this world, 
we seek to grasp what we see . . . Narrative gives us this understanding . . . [W]ithout under-
standing the narrative, we often feel we don’t understand what we see.”). 
54   ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 41 (“We are made in such a way that we continually look for 
the causes of things. The inevitable linearity of story makes narrative a powerful means of 
gratifying this need. . . . Narrative . . . , simply by the way it distributes events in an orderly, 
consecutive fashion, very often gives the impression of a sequence of cause and effect.”). 
55   Id. at 44. 
56   Berger, supra note 32, at 281. 
57  Id. 
58   Id. at 282. 
59   ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 11. 
60   See, e.g., Phelan, supra note 13, at 168. 
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In light of narrative’s power, a number of commentators have warned that 
narrative’s persuasive effect can be dangerous.62 This critique is longstanding: 
As reported in Plato’s Republic, Socrates would have banned poets from his 
republic because their art influenced the heart rather than the mind.63 Critics of 
narrative’s power emphasize that narrative can be false or irrational—a danger-
ous combination when paired with narrative’s ability to create the impression 
of causation.64 And while stories are able to unseat stereotypes, they themselves 
may call on cognitive shortcuts like stereotypes.65 
To sum up, this is the first big point narrative theory has to teach the law: 
narrative is universal, because it’s how we experience the world and communi-
cate our experience—which is what makes it powerfully persuasive.  
2. A Theory of Narratives in Contest 
A second important insight that narrative theory offers to legal thinkers is 
the concept of narrative contest: narratives are always potentially in contest, 
and a responsiveness to that contest is “built into the nature of narrative[s].”66 
By considering the other possible narratives that could compete with the narra-
tive we are encountering, we can reach a more meaningful assessment of a par-
ticular narrative. 
When we study a narrative, we can see what it encodes about the nature of 
narrative or about the time, place, and people from which it arose.67 Implicit in 
                                                                                                                                 
61   See ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 59–60 (“[F]or there to be any kind of success in narrative, 
the codes and formulas that go into it have to be sufficiently flexible to permit all kinds of 
variation in the details.”). See also BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 91 
(“[C]ulture is not all of a piece, and neither are its stock stories. Its vitality lies in its dialec-
tic, in its need to come to terms with contending views, clashing narratives.”). 
62   See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839 (2005). 
63   See id. at 1839; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1991) 
(stating “[s]uch a soul will be like that banished poetry which contained images of vice as 
well as of virtue”). 
64   See ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 42 (noting that the same causation that makes narrative a 
gratifyingly persuasive experience “can also make it a treacherous one, since it implicitly 
draws on an ancient fallacy that things that follow other things are caused by those things.”); 
Peter Brooks, Narrative in and of the Law, in A COMPANION TO NARRATIVE THEORY 415, 
416 (James Phelan & Peter J. Rabinowitz eds., 2005) (“[N]arrative is morally a chameleon 
that can be used to support the worse as well as the better cause.”); Yoshino, supra note 62, 
at 1890 (describing “literature’s ostensible vices: its falsity, irrationality, and seductive-
ness.”). 
65   Catharine A. MacKinnon, Law’s Stories as Reality and Politics, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 232, 235 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) 
(“[T]he [narrative] form itself is no guarantee of a view from the outside or the bottom. Sto-
ries break stereotypes, but stereotypes are also stories, and stories can be full of them.”). See 
also SCHANK, supra note 41, at 57 (“Different people understand the same story differently 
precisely because the stories they already know are different.”). 
66   Phelan, supra note 13, at 166. 
67   Id. at 167. 
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the study of narratives is the idea that we never observe a story directly; we are 
always putting it together from what we are told or what we read.68 
In addition to a narrative’s characteristics relative to the circumstances of 
its telling, another feature of narrative deserves attention: the fact that “every 
story is potentially contestable by multiple alternatives.”69 In other words, be-
cause narrative involves “telling” an account of freestanding events (the story), 
for some purpose and for some audience, then every narrative could be told in 
multiple ways for different purposes and for different audiences.70 The potential 
for contest between narrative accounts is built into the nature of narrative it-
self.71 
Narrative’s contestability comes from its inherent flexibility.72 Because 
tellers can craft a narrative in different ways, for different purposes, anytime a 
story is told, the teller is making a choice among possible alternatives, based on 
her awareness of audience and her purposes.73 For instance, a story might be 
told differently in order to align with different audience values, create different 
responses (say, laughter or inspiration) in the audience, or offer contrasting 
views on a subject.74  
The fact that every narrative is potentially contestable means that “tellers 
are likely to construct their tales at least partly in response to or anticipation of 
one or more possible alternatives.”75 That is, those who would study particular 
narratives can not only look at the narrative itself but can also study the narra-
tive in terms of “the role of those alternatives in a narrative’s construction.”76  
Narratives are not always in contest on a “level playing field.”77 Some nar-
ratives “have the strong endorsement of culturally powerful groups,” making 
them particularly hard to contest; indeed, some narratives rise to the level of 
“sacred.”78 Especially when a culturally powerful narrative is being communi-
cated, reading the narrative with an awareness of the possible contesting alter-
                                                        
68   “[S]tory is always mediated (constructed) by narrative discourse.” ABBOTT, supra note 15, 
at 21. See also id. at 25 (“Narrativity” is “the sense of someone ‘telling a story,’ of a perfor-
mance, of narrative ‘for its own sake.’ ”). 
69   Phelan, supra note 13, at 168. 
70  Id. (“If I can go from experience to narrative in multiple ways and with multiple interpre-
tive purposes, then the way I choose to go can be countered by tellers who prefer different 
routes.”). 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. See also ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 153 (“[N]arratives are in combat in most compart-
ments of life, public and private.”). 
74  Phelan, supra note 13, at 168. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
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native narratives can illuminate “the cultural power of both the given narrative 
and its alternatives.”79 
That legal narratives are in contest is obvious to any lawyer who has writ-
ten a reply brief—or indeed, to any person who has watched a Law & Order 
episode dramatizing two dueling closing statements. But “courts of justice are 
not the only place that contests of narratives can be found.”80 Narrative’s con-
tested nature suggests something that goes deeper than the battle between trial 
narratives that is apparent on the surface of any courtroom drama: even when 
narratives are not ostensibly engaged in a head-to-head battle, they are nonethe-
less being shaped by the possibility of contest and by all the choices that can be 
made among alternative narrations.81 A narrator’s awareness of her purpose, her 
audience, her audience’s shared master-narratives, and possible relevant alter-
native narrations of her story, will all inform her choice of narrative treatment.82  
As the next section will explain, these two points—that narrative is ubiqui-
tous and compelling and that narratives are shaped in part by possible alterna-
tives—have special importance for law. The following section provides an 
overview of law and narrative theory, in order to situate this piece within the 
larger context of the literature on narrative theory and law. 
C. Narrative Theory and Law 
It stands to reason that, because narrative is important to life, it is also im-
portant to law.83 Indeed, “[l]aw lives on narrative” and “the law is awash in sto-
rytelling.”84 According to scholars of law and narrative, law is “a social and 
cultural activity, . . . something we do . . . with language,” and “a kind of rhe-
torical and literary activity.”85 On the robust view of law’s relationship to narra-
tive, the two are inextricably intertwined.86 As a result, narrative theory has a 
great deal to impart to the study of law.87 
Some of law’s relationship to narrative comes from the fact that humans 
understand the world and their experience through narrative. Law is inherently 
narrative because “[a]t its heart . . . [the law] is a way of telling a story about 
                                                        
79  Id. 
80  ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 50. 
81  Phelan, supra note 13, at 168. 
82  Id. 
83  AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 110. 
84  Id. See also Brooks, supra note 64, at 416 (describing “the pervasive presence of narrative 
throughout the law”). 
85  JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW x (1985). 
86  See, e.g., WEST, supra note 9, at 419 (“Simply put, stories are a part, and seemingly an 
indispensable part, of the law with which rights are protected, and as a consequence, story-
telling and rights construction inevitably intertwine.”). 
87  See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL 
CRITICISM 17 (1990) (thinking of law as a narrative or literary activity allows us “a range of 
remarkable opportunities not otherwise available” for interpretation). 
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what has happened in the world and claiming a meaning for it by writing an 
ending to it.”88 According to James Boyd White, the legal process is narrative 
because it begins with a story told to a lawyer by a client,89 and continues with 
that story being told and retold throughout the legal process.90 Narrative is pre-
sent in many places in the legal process, as many scholars have recognized.91  
Further, the common-law tradition of precedent has much in common with 
the practice of narrative.92 We know the common law through telling and re-
telling stories in the form of cases.93 Ronald Dworkin compares judges decid-
ing cases and writing in the common law tradition to the position of “chain 
novelists,” an artificial literary genre made up of “a group of novelists writ[ing] 
a novel seriatim”: “[E]ach novelist in the chain interprets the chapters he has 
been given in order to write a new chapter, which is then added to what the 
next novelist receives, and so on.”94 To Dworkin, the judge—like the chain 
novelist—must make the best of “the material he has been given, what he adds 
to it, and (so far as he can control this) what his successors will want or be able 
to add.”95 Similarly, Peter Brooks writes that the Constitution is “a master nar-
rative, into which each new narrative episode must be fitted.”96 
As judges write in the common-law tradition, legal rules and principles be-
come refined through telling and re-telling, testing against new sets of facts, in 
a similar fashion to the way stories told and retold become powerful cultural 
                                                        
88  WHITE, supra note 85, at 36 (1985). 
89  Id. (“[T]here cannot be a legal case without a real story about real people. . . . Some actual 
person must go to a lawyer with an account of the experience upon which he or she wants 
the law to act, and that account will always be a narrative.”). 
90  Id. (“The client’s narrative is not simply accepted by the lawyer but subjected to question-
ing and elaboration . . . In the formal legal process that story is then retold . . . in developing 
and competing versions, until by judgment or agreement an authoritative version is 
achieved.”). 
91  Bruner has written that narrative’s presence in law is one way it claims validity: “[T]he 
use of recognizable, garden-variety narrative in legal pleading gives us assurance that the 
‘law still belongs to the people.’ ” BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 47–48. 
92  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 229 (1986) (“A judge deciding [a case] adds 
to the tradition he interprets; future judges confront a new tradition that includes what he has 
done.”); see also Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 24, 25 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“[S]torytelling of-
fers real continuities with common-law reasoning; it dwells on particulars while eliciting a 
point that itself may be molded or recast in light of the story’s particulars reviewed in a dif-
ferent time.”). 
93  For instance, on pinpointing the meaning of a legal term like “attractive nuisance,” Bruner 
wrote: “Well, we cannot define it precisely, but we can illustrate by a line of legal precedent 
that tells supposedly similar stories.” BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 9. 
94  DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 229. 
95  Id. 
96  Brooks, supra note 2, at 27 (considering the implications of Justice O’Connor’s statement, 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) that the Constitution is “a cove-
nant running from the first generation of Americans to us and then to future generations”). 
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master narratives.97 Others have made the point that a court opinion, perhaps 
the best and most powerful example of which is the Supreme Court opinion, is 
the ultimate narrative in the legal system.98 It is the point where a story has 
been officially adopted or recognized as “correct,” and with the full coercive 
power of the state behind it, the narrative and resolution—incarceration, re-
lease, injunction, desegregation—that the court has adopted is ordered and put 
into force. This is undeniably a powerful instance of narrative in the legal sys-
tem, and its power is one of the things that make studying the function of narra-
tive in law so rich and valuable. 
But the narrative function of the law is not limited to a particular case’s 
opinion. Because these master-narratives-as-legal-principles are always suscep-
tible to revision, re-interpretation, and re-telling, both judges and lawyers must 
be attuned to the possibility of change in the law.99 The narrative of an opinion 
continues after its publication: in our common law system, new narratives are 
always being generated in each new case. The opinion from one case is scaffold 
and support for the next case to come, which will rely on concepts from earlier 
cases for its narrative and legal authority.100 Every opinion is part of a longer 
conversation of opinions, all narratives about how the law operates in particular 
circumstances. The common law, with its insistence on “like” cases being 
treated “alike,” depends on narrative construction of cases—how after all could 
we know what cases are alike until we have a narrative about what each case is 
actually like?101 
                                                        
97  See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 85, at 87, 98 (“Our central common-law terms acquire their 
meaning from their gradual re-definition, over time, as cases are decided in a wide variety of 
factual circumstances. . . . [T]he law can more properly be seen not as a set of commands or 
rules (even with a set of restatable principles or values behind them) but as the culture of ar-
gument and interpretation through the operations of which the rules acquire their life and 
ultimate meaning.”). 
98  Brooks, supra note 2, at 26 (“Thinking about the place of narrative in American law must 
also and perhaps finally pay attention to the fact that issues of telling and listening—like all 
other issues—find their ultimate commentary in the judicial opinion, especially the Supreme 
Court opinion.”). 
99  See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 89 (noting how, as case law develops in the com-
mon-law process, “[s]uddenly what seemed unchallengeable is challenged, a new or even 
radical interpretation of some important part of legal practice is developed in someone’s 
chambers or study which then finds favor. . . .”); Minow, supra note 92, at 36 (“A story also 
invites more stories, stories that challenge the first one. . . .”); WHITE, supra note 85, at 34 
(“[I]n speaking the language of the law the lawyer must always be ready to try to change it: 
to add or to drop a distinction, to admit a new voice, to claim a new source of authority, and 
so on.”). 
100  See WHITE, supra note 87, at 91 (“The process of giving life to old texts by placing them 
in new ways and in new relations is of course familiar to us as lawyers. It is how the law 
lives and grows and transforms itself. . . . We try to place texts of both sorts in patterns of 
what has been and what will be, and these patterns are themselves compositions. The law is 
thus at its heart an interpretive and compositional—and in this sense a radically literary—
activity.”). 
101  In making this point I am relying on the great work by Linda Edwards and others on 
“narrative reasoning.” See, e.g., Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dia-
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The court opinion, the culmination of the case that serves as a basis for 
other narratives and opinions, comes out of a narrative contest. In our adversar-
ial system, we rely on contest between advocates—a contest between two nar-
ratives—to flush out the ultimate legal narrative.102 Our adversarial system em-
bodies a value that contesting narratives best promotes the fair resolution of 
disputes.103 The contest of narrative is a fundamental part of the way law oper-
ates, and in the words of James Boyd White, it is “not its weakness, but its 
strength.”104  
One implication of the contest of narratives in litigation is the necessary 
consciousness—by decisionmakers and advocates—of the narrativity of any 
legal discourse. That is, because everything—fact or argument—presented to a 
decisionmaker is narrated, it is always a representation, always filtered through 
the narrator.105 
Thus, from the well-recognized contest of narratives at trial, in closing and 
opening statements, in briefs, I discern this value that a contest of narratives is 
positive for the democratic function of the litigation system.106 I also discern 
that the proper functioning of the civil litigation system, which uses adjudica-
tions as a system for testing narratives, relies on an actual contest between 
                                                                                                                                 
lectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7, 11 (1996). There is also a rich 
literature on how reliance solely on analogical reasoning and “category” thinking can lead to 
harmful or limiting results. See generally Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School Rhetoric and New-
School Cognitive Science: The Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEGAL 
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 39, 39 (2016) (explaining that “categories can be harmful be-
cause they tend to erase important context from the client’s story”). 
102  In litigation, “the contesting of interpretation is expected: the conventions of the genre 
call for oppositional debate.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 173 (emphasis omit-
ted). “Even if no interpretive challenger has yet appeared upon the scene, the legal setting 
warns you that one may.” Id. 
103  BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 37 (“[O]pposing stories are at the heart of 
what we loosely refer to as ‘having your day in court.’ ”). 
 104  WHITE, supra note 85, at 104 (“[L]aw is . . . the open hearing in which one point of view, 
one construction of language and reality, is tested against another. . . . [It] makes room for 
different voices, and gives a purchase by which culture may be modified in response to the 
demands of circumstance. It is a method at once for the recognition of others, for the 
acknowledgement of ignorance, and for cultural change.”). 
 105  See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 111 (“[I]ncreasingly, we are coming 
to recognize that both the questions and the answers in . . . matters of ‘fact’ depend largely 
upon one’s choice (considered or unconsidered) of some overall narrative as best describing 
what happened or how the world works. . . . [S]tories are not just recipes for stringing to-
gether a set of ‘hard facts’; . . . stories construct the facts that comprise them.”). 
 106  BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 42 (As a society, we have confidence in the 
use of stories in the legal process because we have inherent “faith that confrontation is a 
good way to get to the bottom of things.”). Alexandra Lahav has explained civil litigation as 
“a form of democratic deliberation,” as “a process in which litigants perform self-
government,” and as a way of forming a “collective identity.” Alexandra D. Lahav, The 
Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1659, 1677 (2016). 
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competing substantive narratives; without such a contest, litigation is not oper-
ating in the way it should.107 
Not only does law develop along a path that narrative helps explain, narra-
tive operates effectively in law as a means of persuasion.108 For instance, schol-
ars argue that legal decisionmakers, including judges and juries, are highly per-
suadable by narrative.109 Excellent lawyers know—sometimes instinctively—
that the most effective way to present a legal case is by matching it to a stock 
story or cultural master narrative that the audience will share.110 
Scholars have argued that narrative is part of the reasoning that takes place 
in legal opinion writing, when judges tell stories about the law.111 For instance, 
Linda Edwards has carefully demonstrated how, in a case without a single 
clear, undisputable legal answer, different narrative frames can be used by de-
cisionmakers to justify widely different results.112 The narrative preconstruc-
tions of law are often well hidden, but the narrative foundations are there none-
theless.113 
                                                        
 107  See WHITE, supra note 85, at 174 (“[T]here is in the law an openness to multiple sto-
ries. . . . This openness is not accidental but structural, and it has significant political and eth-
ical consequences as well as intellectual ones. It is in fact built into the idea of the hearing, 
the central form of legal life and discourse, for at the hearing two stories are told in competi-
tion with one another, and a choice between them—or of a third—is forced upon the decid-
er.”). 
 108  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Storytelling and Constitutional Law: 
The Medium and the Message, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 37, 
42 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“[S]tories have a persuasive power that trans-
cends rational argument.”) Farber and Sherry argue that language does important work in the 
law, “bypass[ing the] process of rational consideration” and “instead creat[ing] the structure 
or mindset in which what society calls rationality takes place.” Id. at 41. 
 109  The party who can tell the most coherent narrative, using the details available to them, 
will be successful at trial or in a request to a decisionmaker such as a decision on admitting 
evidence or seeking summary judgment. See Stern, supra note 12, at 8. 
 110  Against the cognitive backdrop of stock scripts and culturally-significant narratives, the 
lawyer “designs a rhetorical strategy.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 48. “The 
lawyer is called upon to present (or imagine) the best possible case . . . and must do so in full 
knowledge that a lawyer for the other party may, presumably with equal assiduity, present a 
contrary brief. Immediately or potentially, categorizing under law is an adversary process.” 
Id. See also Brooks, supra note 31, at 17 (“No doubt any courtroom advocate knows the im-
portance of narrative presentation instinctively.”). 
 111  See, e.g., Linda H. Edwards, The Humanities in the Law School Curriculum: Courtship 
and Consummation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 355, 360 (2016). These stories sometimes re-
semble larger cultural “myths” or “master narratives” of a culture. Id.; see also id. at 360–61, 
n.42 (“Master narratives can also be thought of as myths. In its technical sense, a myth is a 
story that transmits a portion of a worldview held by a particular people.”). 
 112  See id. at 363. Edwards aptly demonstrates how, in situations where the law is not clear 
or where both parties can present reasonable and logical arguments, “legal outcomes can be 
dictated not so much by deductive argument and traditional Langdellian legal analysis but 
rather by the choice of constitutive myth.” Id. at 380. 
 113  Id. at 361 (“That these stories do their formative work beneath the surface of routine law 
talk simply makes them all the more powerful and all the more worthy of our attention.”). 
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For all these reasons, the legal system is a paradigmatic example of narra-
tives in contest.114 The trial, in particular, with its competing narratives told 
through opening and closing statements, witness testimony, and cross-
examination, has been thoroughly studied by scholars of law and scholars of 
narrative alike.115  
Narrative’s persuasive power has given rise to law and narrative as a disci-
pline.116 A rich tradition of law-and-narrative, or law-and-literature, scholarship 
emerged from the legal academy beginning in the 1980s and 1990s.117  
The study of narrative in law has also sparked some resistance to the use of 
storytelling, particularly in light of its persuasive abilities.118 Often, the concept 
of narrative in law is conflated with disfavored emotional appeals. For instance, 
some commentators advocate, with good reason, that narrative that is only an 
emotional appeal has no place in legal documents.119  
                                                        
 114  See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE 
AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 84, 86 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (explaining that 
courtroom “advocacy leads to a natural proliferation of stories at trial. Lawyers like to put 
every conceivable account on the table.”); Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, 
in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 5 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz 
eds., 1996) (“Storytelling in law is narrative within a culture of argument. Virtually everyone 
in the legal culture—whether a trial lawyer presenting her case to a court or jury, a judge an-
nouncing his findings about what happened in the case, even a law professor writing an arti-
cle—is explicitly or implicitly making an argument and trying to persuade.”). 
 115  See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 175–83 (analyzing narrative function in trials); 
Gewirtz, supra note 114, at 7 (explaining that the study of trial narratives is a “large and 
immensely rich subject[]” and also “familiar . . . in the legal literature, where extensive con-
sideration is given to trial procedures”). See generally W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. 
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE (1981); ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999). 
 116  See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, supra note 108, at 49 (“Any effort to persuade . . . must take 
place at a . . . deep level and clearly cannot put its main reliance on the indeterminate process 
of legal reasoning. Hence, as the storytelling literature teaches, the way to proceed is not 
through traditional forms of rational argument. Instead, persuasion must take place through 
the use of stories which can operate at a deep level of mindset construction. . . . At the level 
of methodology, this means legal storytelling.”). 
 117  See Linda H. Edwards, Speaking of Stories and Law, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: 
JALWD 157, 160 (2016). 
 118  See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, supra note 108, at 50 (“Law . . . has often been seen as the 
province . . . of reason rather than emotion. . . . This belief in the primacy of reason rather 
than rhetoric underlies much of the resistance to both the message and the medium of story-
telling.”). For examples of criticism of the power of storytelling in law, see, for example, 
Alan M. Dershowitz, Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 99, 102 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
 119  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF 
PERSUADING JUDGES 31 (2008) (advising against “a blatant appeal to sympathy or other emo-
tions” in legal writing because “reason is paramount with judges and . . . overt appeal to their 
emotions is resented”). 
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Applying narrative theory to law has also revealed some broader hostility 
to narrative.120 For instance, one scholar has written that law ignores its narra-
tive content because law “wants to believe that it is rooted in irrefutable princi-
ples and that it proceeds by reason alone.”121  
Some of the resistance to narrative’s use in the law comes from the recog-
nition that narrative can be manipulated to reach ends that are not necessarily 
just or efficient.122 There is a concern that using narrative in law implies a tele-
ology that doesn’t actually exist in the real world: a sense that the story as nar-
rated moves naturally to its ending and that we can draw normative conclusions 
from the phenomena in the real world that make up the events of a tale as 
told.123 
Certainly, master narratives are persuasive, including in law.124 Lucy Jewel 
has explained that certain “tropes and images,” when raised in the courtroom, 
can “trigger[] deeply engrained neural networks” and give rise to negative reac-
tions.125 And the practice of narrative, when it does not match audience expec-
tations, can drive division between audience and narrator.126 
 But to the extent that a powerful master narrative is at work in a legal con-
text, advocates are not limited to the stories they receive from the dominant cul-
ture. The audience, whether judge or jury, can be influenced through narrative 
to change the way it thinks. A powerful counter-narrative—that is, a narrative 
                                                        
 120  Bruner notes that law’s concern with narrative has often been “to control it or to sanitize 
its effects,” such as through “forg[ing] procedures for keeping the stories of plaintiffs and 
defendants within recognized bounds.” BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 11. See 
also id. at 48 (“[A]ttorneys and judges do not like being complimented as great storytellers. 
They work hard to make their law stories as unstorylike as possible, even anti-storylike: fac-
tual, logically self-evident. . . .”). 
 121  Brooks, supra note 64, at 415–16. To the extent the law does recognize its entanglement 
with narrative, it “reacts to [narrative] with unease and suspicion, so that the neglect of nar-
rative as a legal category is possibly an act of repression, an effort to keep the narrativity of 
the law out of sight.” Id. at 415. 
 122  For instance, should a decisionmaker such as a jury be swayed by an advocate’s narrative 
“characterization,” there may be a “situation in which the power of the culture itself, residing 
in the deeply inculcated beliefs of a dominant element of the culture” may prevail, contrary 
to the facts but “without at all violating the letter of the law.” ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 
187–88. 
 123  See Dershowitz, supra note 118, at 102–03 (arguing there is no “internal logic” or “se-
quential progression” of events in the real world). 
 124  ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 185 (“[T]hey can be powerful rhetorical tools when activated. 
They can absorb the complexity of a defendant’s human nature into the simplicity of a 
type.”). 
 125  Lucy Jewel, Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing Al-
ternatives, 76 MD. L. REV. 663, 681 (2017) (“In any criminal proceeding, a simple reference 
that a legal actor is a black male with a firearm is likely to trigger deep-seated neural path-
ways related to fear.”). 
 126  There is a “complex relationship between storyteller and listener.” Gewirtz, supra note 
114, at 6. Storytelling “can undoubtedly provoke new understandings and engagement from 
listeners. But storytelling (particularly storytelling self-styled as oppositional) can also di-
vide teller from listener. . . .” Id. 
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that undermines the master narrative—can help to lessen the power of cultural 
master narratives and to de-bias the audience.127 
This process need not only happen on the level of an individual case. 
Through the common-law process, master-narratives can be expanded, deep-
ened, challenged, shifted, or changed. By paying attention to the narrative un-
derpinnings and constructions of legal arguments and decisions, advocates may 
be able to minimize the impact of individual bias or perspective on judging. 
With a richer catalog of law-stories, judges and juries will be able to attend to 
and understand different stories, rather than relying on the stories that they al-
ready possess based on individual life circumstances.128 Thus, the presence of 
narrative in law not only ensures the robust contest on which the adversarial 
system is based, it also makes available a diversity of perspectives, which can 
function as a check on culturally powerful master-narratives.  
Narrative theory teaches that narrative’s presence in the law should be the-
orized and understood: to leave legal stories unquestioned and uncontested is to 
give them an outsized power to determine legal questions.129 The reality, de-
scribed above, that narrative is a powerfully persuasive, inviting, and entirely 
natural human mode of communication, means that lawyers, judges, and legal 
scholars ignore narrative at their peril. 
II. A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF CIVIL PRETRIAL LITIGATION 
Even as law’s clear connection to narrative has been recognized, the schol-
arship on law and narrative has left a gap when it comes to the presence of nar-
rative in pretrial litigation. As this section describes, pretrial litigation should 
be recognized as a narrative-building and narrative-testing system, because pre-
                                                        
 127  See ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 188 (“[I]t has been argued that the way to make a deep 
cultural transformation is through the dissemination of counter-narratives, narratives that 
undermine or counterbalance the dominant masterplots of a culture and thus weaken the 
power of prejudicial types.”). The act of receiving stories alone may free listeners from their 
categorical biases. See Harlon L. Dalton, Storytelling on Its Own Terms, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 57, 58 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) 
(“When we engage in traditional legal reasoning, we operate from within existing catego-
ries. . . . We take doctrinal and procedural building blocks as more or less given . . . and we 
scarcely notice the ways our thinking is structured and cabined. In contrast, when we listen 
to stories well told, we step outside the existing categories and the prevailing mindset.”); see 
also Jewel, supra note 125, at 690 (describing the challenge of using counter-narratives to 
“alter pre-existing majoritarian neural pathways”). 
 128  See Farber & Sherry, supra note 108, at 42 (explaining that “the tacit understandings that 
determine mindsets may be transmitted through stories”—“particularly if the term ‘stories’ is 
considered to include narratives, images, and similar types of communication” and that “it is 
only a small step to the view that mindsets are created by and changed through stories.”). See 
also ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 188. 
 129  See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 111, at 381 (“If we accept a myth—any myth—without 
question, we have given up a portion of our freedom. The unseen work of the myth creates 
our assumptions and constrains our options. But we cannot cross-examine a myth unless we 
recognize its work, becoming aware of its fingerprints on the legal issues of our day.”). 
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trial narratives are foundational to the proper functioning of the U.S. justice 
system.  
A. Neglected Pretrial Narratives 
Although law rests on narrative,130 certain areas of legal practice and pro-
cedure are more thoroughly studied in the field of law and narrative. First, law 
and narrative scholarship tends to focus on criminal, rather than civil, cases and 
on formal trial and appellate, rather than pretrial, narratives. Studies of narra-
tive in the courtroom focus on witness testimony and lawyers’ argumentation, 
and on the resulting court opinions,131 and attention is most often given to the 
most privileged form of legal writing, judicial decisions,132 so that U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions receive the most attention.  
Yet the function of narratives in civil pretrial has received less study. I 
draw attention to the following points about the gaps in coverage of law and 
narrative scholarship both to emphasize the tradition on which I am building 
and to point out a space for analysis that this article begins to fill. As this sec-
tion explains, all the reasons narrative’s function in pretrial procedure may have 
been previously neglected are, in fact, valuable reasons to attend to it now.  
1. Shifting Focus from Criminal to Civil Narratives 
The archetypal law-and-narrative project seems to be the analysis of the 
narratives produced in a criminal case.133 Scholars have, for instance, devoted 
considerable attention to the impact that evidentiary rules have on the narra-
tives developed in criminal prosecution.134 Similarly, scholars have explained 
                                                        
 130  See Stern, supra note 12, at 10 (“Various forms of legal writing and explanation are im-
bued with narrative qualities. . . .”). 
 131  See id. at 9. 
 132  See id. at 10 (noting that, in the study of law and narrative, “it is worth focusing specifi-
cally on judgments because they figure so prominently, for lawyers and for the public, as the 
law’s own means of justifying its conclusions and describing its operations”). 
 133  See, e.g., BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 115, at 32 (“[T]he procedures in criminal tri-
als seem designed to promote objectivity in the process of making judgments about carefully 
circumscribed issues.”); see also, e.g., PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING 
GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 8 (2000) (considering the law’s treatment of confession in 
criminal adjudication); BURNS, supra note 115, at 103, 123 (interpreting the narratives used 
in the opening statements in a murder case); Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1599 (2009) (arguing “that the police confessional is a space where the truth is 
produced by the interrogator’s strategic use of narratives that exploit popular ways of think-
ing about the gap between legal liability and moral culpability for criminal misconduct”); 
Gewirtz, supra note 114, at 2–3 (noting that the public’s interest in law’s stories is particu-
larly strong when it comes to “criminal investigations and trials,” because “the criminal 
prosecution most fully engages the public’s narrative desires and the scholar’s narrative 
speculations”). 
 134  See Peter Brooks, Clues, Evidence, Detection: Law Stories, 25 NARRATIVE 1, 3–4 (2017) 
(considering Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine); Peter Brooks, “Inevitable 
Discovery”—Law, Narrative, Retrospectivity, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 71, 79 (2003) (ex-
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how “rape shield” laws “limit women” by forcing women to “narrate an arche-
typal ‘story[.]’ ”135 In the criminal context, law often excludes narrative from 
formal proceedings—which is generally in line with law’s sense of discomfort 
around narrative.136  
Despite the criminal focus of prior law and narrative studies, there is no 
reason to prefer criminal to civil litigation. The function of narrative in civil 
suits is just as worthy of serious study as narrative in criminal cases. Criminal 
trial narratives may present the archetypal example of individual versus state 
power137 and ideas with which narrative theory is concerned, like stock sto-
ries.138 But civil matters are sufficiently complex and important that they de-
serve as serious narrative study as do criminal law matters.139  
As scholars have recognized, a focus on criminal over civil matters ignores 
the importance of vindicating individual rights against private as well as gov-
ernment actors.140 Civil suits impact interests that are important to citizens’ eve-
                                                                                                                                 
ploring the “ ‘narratological’ implications” of the inevitable discovery rule); see also, e.g., 
Robert P. Burns, A Short Meditation on Some Remaining Issues in Evidence Law, 38 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2008); Bruce Ching, Narrative Implications of Evidentiary Rules, 
29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 971, 972 (2011); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 
GEO. L.J. 281, 298 (2013); Kara MacKillop & Neil Vidmar, Decision-Making in the Dark: 
How Pre-Trial Errors Change the Narrative in Criminal Jury Trials, 90 CHI. KENT L. REV. 
957, 969 (2015); Simon Stern, Legal Fictions and Exclusionary Rules, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 157, 166 (Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twining eds., 2015). 
 135  Kathryn C. Swiss, Confined to a Narrative: Approaching Rape Shield Laws Through Le-
gal Narratology, 6 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 397, 398, 401, 414 (2014) (considering “the ways 
in which rape shield laws ‘shape’ the narrative space, and thus the narrative capacity, of rape 
victims. . . . [A]s a narrator, the victim must attempt to bring her story . . . to conform with 
an archetype in order to succeed at trial. Breaking from the expected story model . . . is dan-
gerous, because it deprives the audience (the jury) of an archetypal story they believe evokes 
guilt.”); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 
2085–86 (1989) (considering competing narratives in rape cases). 
 136  See Brooks, supra note 2, at 20 (“The law tends to limit and formalize conditions of tell-
ing and listening, as if from a suspicion of the force of narratives.”). 
 137  See, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, The Resistance Defense, 64 ALA. L. REV. 589, 615, n.144 
(2013) (“[C]riminal law is a tangible, unfiltered, and constant exercise of state power in our 
lives.”). 
 138  Embedded knowledge structures, such as stock stories, function powerfully in criminal 
law, as Sherri Keene has explained. Sherri Lee Keene, Stories That Swim Upstream: Uncov-
ering the Influence of Stereotypes and Stock Stories in Fourth Amendment Reasonable Sus-
picion Analysis, 76 MD. L. REV. 747, 757 (2017) (“Put plainly, as jurors heard the prosecu-
tion’s story . . . they may have unconsciously referenced a familiar stock story, and the 
image invoked in their mind might have involved a similar scene with similar characters.”). 
See also Justin Hansford, Demosprudence on Trial: Ethics for Movement Lawyers, in Fergu-
son and Beyond, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2057, 2065 (2017) (noting that stock stories have a 
great deal of power in the criminal context). 
 139  As in other legal contexts, it is time for the study of law and narrative to expand from 
criminal to the civil context. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1109 (2006) (“The idea that individuals ought to be empowered and 
equipped in the contest with the state migrated from the criminal side to civil litigation.”). 
 140  Even civil lawsuits have the potential to interrupt justice and inflict injury. See, e.g., 
DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 1–2 (“The injury is gravest when an innocent person is convict-
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ryday lives,141 including lawsuits involving civil rights, employment discrimi-
nation, consumer protection, debts, child custody, landlord-tenant and foreclo-
sure, contracts, personal injury, products liability, and medical malpractice. 
Civil judgments carry significant collateral consequences142 and the potential to 
impose harmful stigma.143 Studying civil lawsuits is especially important given 
the legal power of private actors.144 As well, criminal trials, like civil trials, are 
increasingly rare.145 
This article’s focus on civil pretrial narrative recognizes the special value 
that narrative offers to litigants concerned with civil rights; the focus reflects a 
deep belief that civil litigation is a meaningful route for vindicating those 
rights. Indeed, many valuable rights have been vindicated or recognized by civ-
il lawsuits. Though the impact of social inequality and the influence of bias 
based on race, economic class, gender, and religion are often at work in crimi-
nal trials and the stories constructed there, civil lawsuits present an important 
opportunity to explicitly address unlawful bias, discrimination, and inequality.  
2. Shifting Focus from Appellate to Pretrial Narratives 
Court opinions are another main focus of law and narrative study.146 The 
iconic situation for narrative analysis is a major rights-deciding case that reach-
es the United States Supreme Court, resulting in a dominant narrative adopted 
as “the law of the land.”147 Beyond the study of opinions, academic attention 
                                                                                                                                 
ed of a crime, but it is substantial enough when a plaintiff with a sound claim is turned away 
from court or a defendant leaves with an undeserved stigma.”); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, The 
Prioritization of Criminal over Civil Counsel and the Discounted Danger of Private Power, 
42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 889, 889 (2015). 
 141  See, e.g., Sabbeth, supra note 140, at 908 (defining “ ‘basic human needs’ ” potentially 
affected in civil lawsuits to “include five categories: shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and 
child custody”). 
 142  Id. at 913 (“[A]ny civil judgment will damage the defendant’s credit, and a person’s 
credit score in the U.S. economy is one of his or her most valuable possessions.”). 
 143  Id. at 915 (“[S]tigma is not unique to criminal convictions.”). 
 144  See, e.g., id. at 892 (“Private actors control access to essential goods and services as well 
as information and communication mechanisms that facilitate participation in democratic 
society. . . . The power of these private actors, like the power of government actors, is sub-
ject to abuse when left unchecked.”). 
 145  The plea bargain is almost ubiquitous. See Stephen B. Bright, The Richard J. Childress 
Memorial Lecture 2016 Keynote: The Continuing Denial of Counsel and Assembly-Line 
Processing of Poor People Accused of Crimes, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 605, 606 (2017) (“Nine-
ty-five percent of the cases in the criminal justice system are resolved by plea bargains.”). 
 146  See Gewirtz, supra note 114, at 9 (“The judicial opinion is a central text in the American 
legal system.”); WHITE, supra note 87, at 91 (“The great contribution of the judicial mind is 
not the vote but the judicial opinion, which gives meaning to the vote.”). 
 147  See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 54 (analyzing the narrative categori-
zation occurring in two U.S. Supreme Court opinions); BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra 
note 33, at 53 (using Brown v. Board of Education as “an example of how literature finds its 
way into the law’s corpus juris. . . .”); see also Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judi-
cial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 193 (Peter 
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has tended to focus on narrative in appellate briefs148 and on the narratives that 
result from the trial process and post-trial proceedings.149 Although many forms 
of legal writing involve narrative, the attention is most often given to the most 
privileged forms of legal writing, including judicial decisions.150 
As a result, civil pretrial narratives are understudied relative to appellate 
decisions, for several possible reasons. First, there is a well-noted bias in legal 
scholarship in favor of federal appellate decisions, especially decisions of the 
Supreme Court, as a subject of study151; the study of narrative is no different. 
Pretrial procedure is far-removed from the appellate bench and happens even in 
non-federal courts.152  
The more-studied appellate and trial narratives happen at significant rhetor-
ical crossroads in a case. These narratives usually occur in response to well-
                                                                                                                                 
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (noting that, “[b]ecause of the fixation by most constitu-
tional scholars on the decisions and practices of the Supreme Court alone, academic ink is 
spilled almost exclusively over [Supreme Court] cases. . . .”). 
 148  See, e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 137 (2008). For a useful bibliography on applied legal storytell-
ing (“[T]he use of stories—and of storytelling or narrative elements—in law practice, in law-
school pedagogy, and within the law generally.”), see J. Christopher Rideout, Applied Legal 
Storytelling: A Bibliography, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 247, 248, 254 (2015). 
 149  ABBOTT, supra note 15, at 177 (noting how a trial is “a contest of stories played out in a 
contest of narratives.”); BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 37 (“A legal story is a 
story told before a court of law.”); BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE 
COHERENCE 61–88 (1988) (considering narrative theories of the trial). 
 150  See Stern, supra note 12, at 10 (noting that “[v]arious forms of legal writing and explana-
tion are imbued with narrative qualities” but concluding that in the study of law and narra-
tive, “it is worth focusing specifically on judgments because they figure so prominently, for 
lawyers and for the public, as the law’s own means of justifying its conclusions and describ-
ing its operations.”). 
 151  See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Meth-
odological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1820 (2010) 
(“The Court’s docket generally has more normatively difficult, high-stakes cases than the 
lower federal courts, and perhaps more than state supreme courts. . . . [T]hese types of cases 
are the focus of legal scholarship, law teaching, and public attention.”); Hon. Jack L. Lan-
dau, Oregon as A Laboratory of Statutory Interpretation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 564 
(2011) (“[F]or too long, legal scholarship in this area has focused on decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court, as if that were all the law that matters.”); cf. Levinson, supra note 
147, at 193 (“[M]ost ordinary citizens receive their law from [lower federal and state] courts 
rather than from the absent, often-mysterious entity far off in Washington, D.C.”). 
 152  This article does focus on federal pretrial litigation, in part because federal courts hear 
much of the nation’s civil rights litigation. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common 
Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1831, 1838, 1863 (2016). State court litigation is worthy of study as well, in light of the 
sheer volume of cases handled by state courts and resulting impact on the lives of Ameri-
cans. See, e.g., David Lyle, The Politicization of State Courts Threatens Fundamental 
Rights: The Empirical Case, 42 HUM. RTS. 5, 5 (2017) (“[F]or most Americans, state 
courts are ‘the law’ because they handle over 90 percent of the nation’s judicial business.”). 
Federal courts are also a useful focal point because procedural practice in state courts often 
resembles that of federal courts. See also Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 
WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1049 (2016); Resnik, supra note 139, at 1111. 
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known genres and rules (for instance, the opinion’s rhetorical structure, or the 
framework for direct and cross-examination), and they are highly processed (by 
which I mean the tellers have worked them over and over to create a seamless 
tale, a clean narrative line, and an air of authority).153 By their very nature, ap-
pellate court opinions command authority as the definitive narration of a legal 
story; a well-written opinion admits of no indecision.154 And with respect to 
Supreme Court cases, there is a very limited data set to review.155 
The narratives that emerge in pretrial litigation lack most, or all, of these 
characteristics. Pretrial matters may appear routine.156 Pretrial procedures may 
not produce instances of a recognized genre of legal narrative like a brief. Un-
like the narratives in an appellate opinion or brief, narratives developed prior to 
trial may not have a clean narrative line.157 They may deal in probabilities, not 
certainties. They are often stories about what might or can or is likely to devel-
op—what may be discovered to be the case.  
As well, pretrial narratives tend to be products of complex, often geograph-
ically unique rules.158 Unlike narratives developed in the Supreme Court or 
even in federal appellate cases, which tend to be uncontested and based on a set 
record, the narratives developed in pretrial may be as unique and varied as 
claims and local practices and court orders in specific cases. Finally, narratives 
prior to trial may escape notice because they are generated and developed out-
side a court’s view.159 The narratives’ content may only come before a court 
when packaged into a motion.160  
                                                        
 153  See Resnik, supra note 152, at 1833. Trial-level decisions often contain more factual de-
tail than appellate decisions. See Stern, supra note 12, at 21 (“Trial decisions, for example, 
typically include enough facts to support any of the alternative theories that might justify the 
judge’s conclusions, whereas appellate decisions, zeroing in on a particular doctrinal issue, 
can be sparer. . . .”). 
 154  A judicial opinion can imply the given narrative “simply is what happened, and there is 
no underlying story worth excavating and comparing.” Stern, supra note 12, at 11. “[T]he 
decision eschews any narrative techniques that would elicit another version of the story.” Id. 
Stern’s statement suggests that richer sources of narrative exist in litigation than the “elabo-
rately processed text” of the judicial opinion. Id. 
 155  See Resnik, supra note 152, at 1833 (“Fixing attention on the U.S. Supreme Court has 
become easy by its production of a predictable and tidy corpus, down to fewer than ninety 
opinions annually and concluding major pronouncements each year by July 1.”). 
 156  Pretrial litigation may be ignored because, as Amsterdam and Bruner write, “familiarity 
is dulling . . . when our ways of conceiving of things become routine, they disappear from 
consciousness and we cease to know that we are thinking in a certain way or why we are do-
ing so.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 1. 
 157  See, e.g., Stern, supra note 12, at 12 (“[T]rials (and the events leading up to them) 
abound in the features that make narratives absorbing.”). 
 158  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 
46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995). 
 159  Typically, legal narratives only reach a court after significant narrative practice has al-
ready occurred. See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 110 (“Clients tell stories 
to lawyers, who must figure out what to make of what they hear. As clients and lawyers talk, 
the client’s story gets recast. . . . If circumstances warrant, the lawyers retell their clients’ 
stories in the form of pleas and arguments to judges and testimony to juries.”). A great deal 
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Even scholars interested in the highly visible world of appellate cases and 
theory should pay attention to the narrative-erasing functions of pretrial proce-
dure. Without narrative development prior to trial, there is less chance of mean-
ingful narrative contest on appeal. For instance, a summary judgment motion 
decided on discovery limited under the proportionality standard cannot present 
as rich a contest of narratives on the substantive law as one developed with nar-
rative-rich discovery. Appellate case law’s development depends on the quality 
of narrative development in lower courts, which depends on pretrial litigation. 
The foundational nature of pretrial narratives to many aspects of law’s devel-
opment is an important reason for pretrial narratives to receive more attention.  
B. Locating Narrative in Pretrial Litigation  
Although little attention has been paid to pretrial narratives, the pretrial 
process generates texts that should be understood as narratives in their own 
right. Using the understanding of narrative and its place in the law set forth 
above, we can locate narrative throughout pretrial litigation, and identify the 
forces that shape narrative prior to trial. Narratives developed prior to trial de-
termine the narratives that can be developed during the rest of a case’s lifetime. 
By identifying some of the value associated with pretrial narratives, this article 
demonstrates that narrative’s function in pretrial litigation, long understudied, 
is deserving of serious attention.  
1. Pretrial as a Narrative System 
Litigation is a narrative-creating process, and litigation prior to trial is 
packed with narrative.161 In fact, to use the words of narrative theorists, the civil 
trial process is a narrative system.162 As defined by narrative theorist Mieke 
Bal, a narrative system is one in which narrative texts can be produced accord-
ing to the shared understanding of the participants in the process.163  
As described above, the civil trial process produces easily recognized nar-
rative texts, including court opinions. The civil trial process also produces texts 
less-commonly understood to be narratives, but that exhibit narrative features. 
The shared understanding of the participants in the pretrial process—advocates, 
                                                                                                                                 
of law occurs outside the purview of the courts. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 12 (“[J]udges in 
black robes . . . are not the only or even the most important actors in the legal drama.”). 
 160  See, e.g., Lindsey D. Blanchard, Rule 37(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”: More Bark Than 
Bite, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 132, n.88 (2011) (“[J]udicial reluctance to deal with discovery 
disputes is due in part to the courts’ lack of the time and resources necessary to engage in . . . 
fact-intensive review. . . .”). 
 161  See Stern, supra note 12, at 12 (“[T]he trial process is a narrative process.”). Id. at 21 
(explaining that, at the beginning of a litigation, “there is a proliferation of narrative ener-
gy”). 
 162  MIEKE BAL, NARRATOLOGY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF NARRATIVE 3 (2d ed. 
1997). 
 163  Id. at 3–4. 
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parties, the court—embodied in the rules and practices that govern litigation 
prior to trial, produces a number of narrative texts that merit the same attention 
as the well-studied narratives described in the previous subsection.  
This article argues that pretrial documents such as depositions and discov-
ery are also narratives. Although these documents generated in pretrial litiga-
tion are, like judicial opinions, not literary narratives,164 they nonetheless em-
body the characteristics of narrative. Proceeding from Phelan’s definition of a 
narrative as someone telling someone else about something that happened, for a 
particular purpose,165 pretrial documents like pleadings, motions (dispositive 
and procedural), depositions, and discovery all possess the features of narrative. 
Perhaps most obviously, pleadings and motions have long been treated as 
having narrative aspects. Motions, for instance, most closely resemble the for-
mat of what we consider a narrative: the statement of facts lays out the story of 
the parties’ relevant interactions in a format that many would recognize as a 
narrative. And a wide range of books and articles on legal writing impart the 
wisdom that the statement of facts in a brief should read and function like a 
“story”—in other words, a narrative.166 
The complaint has also been recognized for its narrative qualities.167 Even 
though the complaint, with its numbered paragraphs and recitation of legal 
claims, perhaps less obviously demonstrates the characteristics of a narrative, it 
still relates a story. After all, the complaint’s stated purpose is to “show[] that 
the pleader is entitled to relief,”168 mirroring the writing-workshop advice 
“show, don’t tell.”169 And the answer, which responds to the allegations in the 
complaint, is an instance of narrative as well—a counter-narrative told in re-
sponse to the narrative of the complaint.  
Beyond these pretrial texts that have been recognized as narratives, even 
less-obviously-narrative materials produced in litigation prior to trial (deposi-
tions, discovery, and case management documents) can be seen as narrative 
texts and are deserving of careful study.  
Depositions present near-archetypal instances of narrative texts. At a depo-
sition, a witness presents testimony under oath, typically in response to oppos-
                                                        
 164  See Stern, supra note 12, at 2. 
 165  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
166  See, e.g., ROSS GUBERMAN, POINT MADE: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE NATION’S TOP 
ADVOCATES 58 (2d ed. 2014) (advising that “the facts in a brief should read like narrative 
nonfiction, a bit like something you’d read in The Atlantic or The New Yorker. Or perhaps in 
A River Runs Through It.”). 
167  AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 15, at 134 (describing “pleadings” as “rhetorical nar-
ratives”); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading 
Practice, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 3 (2009); Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story: 
Using Narrative Theory to Understand and Overcome the Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 57 (2014). 
168  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
169  Ralph, supra note 167, at 40–41 n.245. 
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ing counsel’s questioning.170 The deposition, then, functions similarly to the 
cross-examination of a witness at trial, but in a setting without a judge. The 
deposition, too, fits Phelan’s definition of a narrative: someone (the deponent) 
telling someone else (the audience for a deposition is broad—more on that in a 
moment) something that happened (the events concerning the lawsuit, for in-
stance) for a particular purpose. The purpose of the “telling” in the deposition 
may be to create an account of the underlying events in the case, to elucidate 
the legal issues in a case, to strengthen one party’s claims or defenses, to 
demonstrate the deponent’s strengths as a witness, or to encourage resolu-
tion.171 And the deposition’s audience is broad: not only is the deponent narrat-
ing her story to opposing counsel, but to her own counsel, and to others in-
volved who may come into contact with the deposition transcript—the court, 
other parties to the case, and the eventual jury or mediator.172  
Beyond depositions, other forms of discovery should be considered narra-
tive texts. For instance, responses to interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 33, 
demonstrate narrative qualities. Through interrogatories, the requesting party 
may ask the responding party to respond to questions that “relate to any matter 
that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).”173 Interrogatory responses that 
represent the responding party telling the requesting party “something that hap-
pened” are pretrial narratives.  
Responses to document requests, on the other hand, may be less easily rec-
ognized as narrative. For instance, in response to requests by an opposing party, 
a party may produce documents within the scope of discovery responding to a 
particular request. Are these responses narratives? On one view, yes: the docu-
ments themselves are telling the requesting party what documents are, in the 
responding party’s view, relevant to the request, for the purpose of establishing 
the case’s facts or strengthening one party’s claims. But even if a skeptic would 
not accept a pile of documents as a narrative, any responses to document re-
quests have narrative value because they present the constituent and supple-
mentary events that can later be formed into a narrative in a motion or at trial.  
What about case management documents, including reports to the court 
such as the Rule 26(f) report of the parties174 and court-generated documents 
                                                        
170  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1); see also DAVID M. MALONE & PETER T. HOFFMAN, THE 
EFFECTIVE DEPOSITION: TECHNIQUE AND STRATEGIES THAT WORK 3 (4th ed. 2012) (“Few 
hard and fast rules control the conduct of depositions”). 
171  See, e.g., MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 170, at 25–33 (describing purposes of deposi-
tion); THOMAS A. MAUET & DAVID MARCUS, PRETRIAL 286 (9th ed. 2015) (describing depo-
sition’s utility to opposing counsel, deponent’s counsel, and trial). 
172  See MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 170, at 31; MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 171, at 
286. 
173  FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(2). 
174  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1)–(2) (requiring parties to “confer as soon as practicable” and 
to “submit[] to the court within 14 days after the conference a written report” on matters 
such as a proposed discovery schedule). 
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such as the scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16?175 These documents share 
some of the features of narratives: Court orders, such as scheduling orders, re-
semble narrative in that someone (the court) is telling someone else (the par-
ties) about how future events will happen, for the purpose of further developing 
the case’s claims and narratives. And reports of the parties, whether joint or in-
dividual,176 demonstrate narrative characteristics in a similar way. Whether or 
not case management documents are in fact entirely of a piece with narrative, 
they nonetheless shape pretrial narratives, as set forth below.  
With an understanding that these pretrial documents—pleadings, motions, 
discovery and depositions—are narrative texts, this article now proceeds to 
look at the ways that these pretrial narrative texts are shaped.  
2. Narrative-Shaping in Pretrial Litigation 
There is already an understanding that trial narratives and judicial opinion 
narratives are highly processed texts: for instance, the presentation of trial evi-
dence is shaped by evidentiary and procedural rules, and the narratives that 
emerge in judicial opinions are constrained by the genre’s conventions. The in-
sight that procedural and evidentiary rules are narrative-shaping devices is not 
new; in other contexts, scholars have pointed out that rules constrain or enlarge 
the kind of stories that can be told and points at which those stories can be giv-
en voice.177 However, there is little scholarly attention to the fact that the under-
lying texts that contribute to these canonical narratives are themselves con-
strained and processed in particular ways.  
This section begins to highlight the ways that pretrial legal rules and pro-
cedures shape pretrial narratives. Unless we pay attention to these shaping de-
vices, we risk assuming that these stories reach the trial or the opinion as 
“pure” or un-narrated, un-mediated material. Being conscious of the narrativity 
of these pretrial texts allows us to reflect carefully on the strengths and weak-
nesses of the litigation system in which they are generated.  
Several elements shape narratives in pretrial litigation: pretrial procedure 
(including formal rules and informal practices), the other contents of a case, 
and the inherent contestability built into all narratives. First, any student of civil 
procedure can identify the most obvious devices that shape pretrial narrative: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a uniform set of practices that 
“govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States 
district courts.”178 The complaint, for instance, is governed by Rule 8, which 
requires a pleading to include “a short and plain statement of the grounds for 
                                                        
175  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(A) (requiring judge to issue a scheduling order “after receiv-
ing the parties’ report under Rule 26(f)”). 
176  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)–(3) (setting times for parties to make initial disclosures, dis-
closures of expert witnesses, and disclosures about evidence the parties may present at trial). 
177  See, e.g., BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 12. 
178  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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the court’s jurisdiction,” “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “a demand for the relief sought.”179 The 
complaint is also shaped by Rule 10, which requires a party to “state its claims 
. . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of 
circumstances.”180 These rules shape the narrative in the complaint by indicat-
ing how detailed the narrative should be—“short” and “plain”—and by indicat-
ing the form the narrative should take. No advocate, having read Rule 10, 
would mistakenly believe that a pleading should be presented in the form of a 
sonnet or a screenplay.  
To the extent that court-made rules add to the requirements of pretrial pro-
cedural rules, those are also narrative-shaping devices. For instance, since the 
Twombly/Iqbal pleading revolution, a court reading a complaint to determine 
whether it states a claim should consider not only whether the plain text of Rule 
8 is met but also whether the plaintiff has met the heightened plausibility stand-
ard.181 This court-made plausibility rule shapes the complaint in a different 
way, encouraging pleaders to add factual content.182  
In addition to formal rules, pretrial narratives are shaped by less formalized 
practices. Consider, for example, the common deposition practice of reserving 
all objections except as to form.183 In this practice, for instance, an objection to 
hearsay testimony (which would not be admissible at trial and which would be 
ineligible for consideration at summary judgment) would not need to be raised 
at deposition.184 In a deposition following this practice of reserving all objec-
tions except as to form, the deposition testimony—the narrative generated at 
deposition—could be detailed, broad, and certainly different than the narrative 
that would be generated at a deposition where every objection successfully lim-
ited testimony. The deposition narrative is also broader than what could be nar-
rated in the statement of facts in a brief at the summary judgment phase.  
Pretrial narratives are also shaped by attorneys. It would be a mistake to as-
sume that there is any pretrial narrative that tells things as they really are, with-
out mediation or narration. Attorneys draft pleadings, they assist in answering 
discovery, they often draft affidavits and declarations that accompany formal 
filings in court, and they prepare their clients for participation in the lawsuit. 
Depositions, for instance, present as verbal answers of a deponent, but the de-
ponent is not the only author of her deposition testimony. The party’s attorney 
will have prepared her in an attempt to shape the narrative that emerges; such 
                                                        
179  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)–(3). 
180  FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). 
181  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 182  See infra Section III. 
183  It is commonly understood that the most important privileges that must be asserted at 
deposition are attorney-client privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination. See 
MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 171, at 315. 
184  See id. 
18 NEV. L.J. 573, RALPH - FINAL 3/28/18  11:10 AM 
602 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:573  
preparation might include advice on what information and key details (constit-
uent events, in the language of narrative theorists) to emphasize.  
Pretrial narratives are also shaped by other documents in the case, such as 
procedural orders. Court orders on procedural matters are narrative-shaping de-
vices, meaning that they are determinants of future stories that can be told—
when, how, by whom, and on what topics.  
Similarly, discovery and depositions, in addition to being narratives them-
selves, are also narrative-shaping devices. Unlike rules and orders that primari-
ly shape by defining or constraining the space for narratives within the trial sys-
tem, discovery and depositions make possible future texts within the system, 
because they introduce the constituent events that future narratives in the case 
will use.185 Discovery is not just gathering outside events (e.g., plucking them 
from some outer-existing narrative) for later narrative construction. In discov-
ery, advocates co-create the events from which later treatments will emerge by 
selecting and describing those events.  
Discovery introduces events in two senses. First, discovery translates or 
particularizes outside events into the case as knowable pieces of information: 
events that have happened, or are alleged to have happened, in the “real world” 
become cognizable in the world of the case. Discovery ensures that there are no 
last-minute surprises in civil suits.186  
Discovery also creates constituent, as opposed to supplementary, events by 
beginning to create a narrative teleology: that is, by identifying things as “evi-
dence of” or “causation for” or “reasons for” particular claims, beliefs, or alle-
gations, discovery starts to shape random points of time or circumstances into 
events. Actions start to take on the shape of purpose. Significant events crystal-
lize; a party is seen to have made realizations or taken steps. After discovery, 
future narratives will contest the meaning or relationship of the particular piec-
es of information, competing to find the narrative that should be preferred as 
most plausible or persuasive.  
With the information translated into the world of the case, the advocates 
and ultimately the finder of fact not only have the narratives that result from the 
discovery of information, they also have the substance for the future narrative 
texts that will develop in the case. While not all the information gained in dis-
covery will be part of the future narrative texts in the case, all discovery mate-
rial nonetheless has the potential to shape those future texts. Not all material 
gleaned in discovery is ultimately admissible for consideration by a court or ju-
ry as to legal liability. Indeed, Rule 26 embodies the principle that information 
need not be admissible to be discoverable.187 Disputes over admissibility come 
                                                        
185  See supra note 27. 
186  See, e.g., Costa v. AFGO Mech. Serv., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 21, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Open 
discovery is the norm. Gamesmanship with information is discouraged and surprises are ab-
horred.”). 
187  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also David M. Katz, Assessing the Federal Rules’ Propor-
tionality Amendment: Why Proportionality Is Philosophically Proper, yet Practically Prob-
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later—particularly at the summary judgment phase or at the motion in limine 
phase immediately prior to trial.188  
Even the ultimately-inadmissible material gained in discovery has the po-
tential to shape future narratives in the suit, because the discovery events that 
will never see the light of day in an officially sanctioned narrative such as trial 
testimony, a motion, or a court opinion can still suggest to the advocates rela-
tionship of causation, intention, connection, or directionality that will show up 
in the eventual narrative treatment of the case’s events. Thus, even if a hearsay 
statement gained at a deposition never enters the later narrative discourse of a 
case, it can still inform the advocate’s ultimate selection of a narrative treat-
ment and subtly have influence on the case.189 
The inherent contestability of narrative also shapes pretrial narrative, be-
cause the litigation system is built around the idea of opposing parties. For eve-
ry pretrial narrative—every deposition, every interrogatory answer—there is 
the possibility that a different, opposing narrative could be crafted. No story is 
told in pretrial litigation without a consciousness of the contest of narrative.  
Pretrial narratives seek not only to persuade of their content, but also to 
persuade of the effectiveness of that communication in the contest of narratives. 
Often, stories are told in pretrial for a procedural purpose: not necessarily to 
show something did happen—as with trying to convince a jury of a fact or of 
guilt or liability—but to earn the right to tell that ultimate story in the contest of 
narrative at trial. The advocates’ storytelling may be about whether it is at least 
plausible or not that X happened (at the motion to dismiss phase), or whether 
there is any question whether Y happened (at the motion for summary judg-
ment phase). The litigants and the court are always evaluating the quality of the 
narrative as against other stories that could be (and are being) told, aware that 
the party who can present the most coherent narrative, using the details availa-
ble to them, will be successful at trial or in a request to a decisionmaker such as 
a motion seeking summary judgment.190 
                                                                                                                                 
lematic, 67 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583, 593 (2017) (“From 1938 until December 2015, discovery 
analysis generally centered on relevance. . . . Under the relevance system, information was 
discoverable if (1) the information was non-privileged and (2) the information was relevant 
to the suit.”). 
188  Generally, hearsay or other inadmissible evidence should not be considered on summary 
judgment. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 10B § 2738 
(4th ed. 2016). But ultimately-inadmissible evidence is often sought in the form of discovery 
or depositions. Broad discovery thus encourages the development, translation, and particu-
larization of even details that will later be closed out—further evidence that discovery is nar-
rative-generating and narrative-fueling process. 
189  Of course, the advocate can also use the procedural devices of a motion in limine to at 
least put this information before a judge if not a jury—to frame the judge’s understanding of 
the narrative in the eventual contest of narratives to follow. 
190  See Stern, supra note 12, at 8–9 (“[W]e may say that the most successful trial narrative or 
interpretation of a precedent will be the one that does the most work in explaining and as-
signing meaning to the details vying for legal significance.”). 
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3. The Value of Pretrial Narratives 
Having made the point that narrative texts are produced in a case prior to 
trial, I want to turn to the value of these narratives. My account relies on a con-
cept of litigation as not only a mechanism for dispute resolution but also as the 
way that litigants—including individual citizens—can participate in the Ameri-
can government process.191 
Litigation involves narrating and re-narrating circumstances giving rise to a 
lawsuit, while also bringing those narrations into an official, ceremonial are-
na.192 Through participation in pretrial litigation, litigants bring their individual 
circumstances and grievances to a lawyer, concretize those experiences into 
written pleadings and other legal documents, present those representations of 
their experiences to opposing parties and to a judge within the court system, 
and begin to refine and contest those representations.193  
Because litigation often doesn’t reach trial, encouraging the development 
of pretrial narratives has significant expressive value. Even for litigants who do 
not receive a court judgment in their matter, the opportunity to present their 
narrative in a pleading has value. Because so many cases are resolved without 
trial (through neglect, settlement, or pretrial judgment),194 the early phases of 
litigation—pleading, motions to dismiss, and discovery—all present important 
opportunities to be heard by the court. But the value of narratives told in pretri-
al litigation is not limited to the value of feeling one’s grievances are heard.  
Pretrial narratives—even in cases that do not reach trial—also contribute to 
the law’s development in significant ways. Even the limited kinds of legal deci-
sions that might be made in a case that resolves prior to trial—for instance, on a 
motion to dismiss, that a particular set of facts does give rise to a plausible 
claim for relief, or on a motion to compel discovery, that a particular kind of 
information is relevant to the subject matter of an action—can make interstitial 
advances in the law.195  
                                                        
191  See, e.g., BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 90. 
192  Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1836 (2014) (“Courts model the 
democratic precepts of equal treatment, demonstrate that the state itself is subject to demo-
cratic constraints, and facilitate democratic revisions of governing norms.”); see also Lahav, 
supra note 106, at 1667 (“For some, the process of litigation is about . . . recognition from a 
government official.”). 
193  See WHITE, supra note 85, at 168 (“[T]he law always begins in story: usually in the story 
the client tells . . . It ends in story too, with a decision by a court or jury, or an agreement 
between the parties, about what happened and what it means.”). 
194  See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE 
L.J. 522, 524 (2012) (“By the year 2002, only 1.8% of federal civil filings terminated in tri-
als of any sort, and only 1.2% in jury trials.”). 
195  See Lahav, supra note 106, at 1658 (“[A]ccess to litigation is necessary for the law to 
evolve because by bringing cases litigants force the courts to interpret and develop the law, 
which information is then used by others to guide their own conduct.”). 
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The narratives produced in pretrial can also bear fruit at the merits resolu-
tion stage of the case.196 Pretrial narratives populate the world of the merits res-
olution (whether at trial or summary judgment), giving advocates a rich tapes-
try of information from which to choose in crafting their ultimate persuasive 
narratives, and giving decisionmakers access to narrative richness in issuing 
their decisions. Rich merits-stage narratives at the trial level also lead to more 
narrative richness in appeals.197  
Over time, the effect of narratives told in pretrial litigation can be great.198 
Not only can small changes occur in individual cases—ultimately, the effect of 
narration will compound. A judge who hears stories in pretrial litigation again 
and again, even if he is initially disinclined to recognize a legally-significant 
narrative, may ultimately be moved to understand a particular kind of narrative 
differently through the recognition of patterns and the function of narrative.199 
On a larger scale, the repetition of pathbreaking pretrial narratives across the 
judicial system may give rise to scholarly, media, or legislative attention to 
ways law might change.200 
The account I have drawn of the value of pretrial narrative to law’s devel-
opment has special import for civil rights plaintiffs, including victims of dis-
crimination or of government abuses. In a litigation system that generates nar-
rative and allows it to develop, the process of telling and re-telling legal 
narratives by citizens whose legal claims have been marginalized, can result in 
judicial awareness of more representative narratives.  
It should be noted that the presence of narrative in pretrial litigation is 
morally neutral—the existence of pretrial narratives is not a guarantee that a 
judge will properly apply the law or be free from the influence of harmful mas-
                                                        
196  See Robert P. Burns, A Short Meditation on Some Remaining Issues in Evidence Law, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2008) (explaining how “a single additional detail, and cer-
tainly a constellation of additional details, can substantially change the significance of the 
stories told at trial.”). 
197  See Anne Moses Stratton, Courtroom Narrative and Findings of Fact: Reconstructing 
the Past One (Cinder) Block at a Time, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 923, 924 (2004). At a trial, 
the trier of fact weighs competing narratives to determine legal liability. See id. at 945–46. 
On appeal, the appellate court reevaluates the narrative. See id. at 946. 
198  Ultimately, airing stories that are unfamiliar allows them to take on legal significance as 
stating a viable claim. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judg-
ment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 713 (2007) (“If wom-
en’s experiences of harm that would otherwise be ‘invisible’ are heard more frequently in 
courts and public settings, those experiences may ultimately be viewed by judges as consti-
tuting a legal claim, and take on legal ‘visibility.’ ”). 
199  See Stern, supra note 12, at 9. 
200   See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 
804 (2008) (“By observing the redundancy of various claims of right and the processes, alle-
gations, and behaviors that become the predicates to judgments, debate can occur not only 
about the particulars of a given procedure and its outcome but also about what the underly-
ing norms ought to be.”). 
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ter narratives.201 Judges, like all people, are susceptible to cognitive biases.202 
And judges are participants in the same culture as other Americans and may be 
influenced by the all the factors that create cognitive biases.203  
For instance, judges may be affected by “belief perseverance,” which caus-
es individuals to place too much weight on evidence that supports an initial be-
lief and to discount evidence that contradicts that initial belief, and by “con-
firmatory bias,” which causes individuals to interpret ambiguous evidence as 
supportive of their belief.204 Thus, a judge who believes herself to be familiar 
with a particular kind of case may form an initial judgment about its merits that 
undermines the judge’s ability to assess plausibility or summary judgment.205 
The problem of cognitive bias can, of course, be especially pernicious when a 
case involves biases based on race, ethnicity, or gender.206 
Although judges bring a “particularized stock of life experiences and un-
derstandings” to their work, scholars working in law and narrative have recog-
nized the potential of counter-narratives to combat judge’s cognitive biases.207 
Delgado and Stefancic described the need for “saving narratives,” which they 
describe as “a well-written, deeply felt counternarrative” that would have ex-
posed a judge in a particular case “to other points of view,” increasing empathy 
                                                        
201  Harmful master narratives may exist about a number of types of cases. See, e.g., Matthew 
I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and Ac-
countability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 940 (2013) (describing how news media portrayal of 
child welfare and foster care lead to an “overarching narrative” that may not accurately re-
flect reality). Judges under particular time pressures or who frequently face similar kinds of 
cases may resort to “cognitive shortcuts that sometimes cause illusions of judgment.” Id. at 
939. More broadly, studies of judicial decisionmaking shows “judges tend to make decisions 
in a largely intuitive way.” Chris Guthrie et. al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (2007). 
202  See Stern, supra note 12, at 9. 
203   Certainly, “stories in the media depicting policy debates, major events, and individual 
stories alike” can “affect judges who, at the end of a day, go home and read the newspapers, 
watch television, go to the movies, and otherwise participate in daily life in America in simi-
lar ways to the general public.” Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and 
the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 216 
(2012). 
204  Reinert, supra note 8, at 1786. Individuals also tend to be overconfident in their own 
abilities and to “underestimate their own biases.” Id. at 1787. 
205   Id.; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Hu-
mility, Aggregate Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 636 (2012) 
(“[J]udges should be reluctant to grant summary judgment unless there is essentially no seri-
ous prospect that others will disagree as to whether the facts are at issue and what the facts 
show.”). 
206   Reinert, supra note 8, at 1788. 
207   Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious 
Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1930 (1991); see also id. at 1953 (“[W]e are all . . . 
constituted in large part by the ‘stories’ or narratives by which we understand and impose 
order on reality. Divergent new narratives, ones that could jar and change us, always spark 
resistance. . . .”). 
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and understanding “through vicarious experience.”208 Cognitive science also 
teaches that a broader range of pretrial narratives may be able to change judges’ 
cognitive biases, because the neural pathways that schema and stock stories oc-
cupy are changeable.209  
To skeptical readers, the question will occur: isn’t narrative a “moral cha-
meleon”?210 What constrains the potential use of narrative for undesirable pur-
poses? Ultimately, traditional safeguards—such as review against constitutional 
principles and checks and balances—offer some guarantee that narratives will 
not get out of hand. Perhaps more importantly for the subject of this article, the 
availability of more narrative—telling counter-narratives, contesting narratives, 
weighing narratives—offers the best inoculation against harmful uses of narra-
tives.  
As this article argues, narratives need not reach the U.S. Supreme Court to 
have value. My account of the value of pretrial legal narrative is much more 
akin to a process value—the generation, development, contest, selection, and 
refinement through the common-law process—matters not just because the end 
result may work its way up to the Supreme Court and become the law of the 
land, but rather because many cases do not follow that path. The narratives de-
veloped and grown in lower-profile, less expensive, less dramatic cases affect 
the legal rights of citizens and whether they can exercise those rights. 
Stories are what the law produces, and stories are what grow the law.211 
Every legal narrative developed becomes a potential contact point—a small 
ledge for a future litigant to affix a grappling hook and hang his or her legal ar-
gument. Over time, as an expanding catalog of legal narratives have been con-
tested and resolved in litigation, new legal pathways develop. Thus, narratives 
enable the law to accommodate citizens in constantly changing times. 
III. NARRATIVE-ERASING PROCEDURE  
Because pretrial narratives have such value to the law, and because rules 
and procedure undeniably shape them, it is vital to pay attention to a phenome-
non that has, so far, escaped critical notice: what I call narrative-erasing proce-
dure. 
Scholars have noted the decline of a number of features of the civil justice 
system: the disappearance of trial in civil cases,212 the significant losses and 
costs that accompany the ever-increasing rates of settlement of civil cases,213 
                                                        
208   Id. at 1931, 1933. Delgado and Stefanic concluded that “saving narratives rarely alter 
judges’ behavior because they are rarely found in the ‘canon’—the group of texts recognized 
as valid and legitimate, the ‘classics’—at any given period in history.” Id. at 1953. 
209   See Jewel, supra note 125, at 692 (“[A]lternative discourses, when they become widely 
dispersed in a culture, have the potential to reshape collective neural pathways.”). 
210   See Brooks, supra note 31, at 416. 
211   See, e.g., BRUNER, MAKING STORIES, supra note 33, at 93–94. 
212   See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 194, at 526. 
213  See Comment, Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984). 
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and the rise of restrictive procedure.214 Restrictive trends in civil procedure tend 
to limit access to courts.215 Restrictive procedure has an especially harsh impact 
on cases that involve various “out-groups” and otherwise marginalized individ-
uals.216  
The scholarly debate has ignored, however, the effects of these restrictive 
procedural trends on narrative. While other scholars have written that proce-
dural changes can have substantive effects,217 and that restrictive procedure 
tends particularly to harm already-marginalized populations,218 this article 
makes a novel contribution to the literature by identifying a particular narrative 
problem: increasingly high procedural hurdles, individually and in combina-
tion, tend to deprive the court system of narrative.  
Narrative-erasing procedure is problematic because, when narratives are 
erased from litigation, the generation, development, and contest of narratives 
that fuels the civil justice system is dampened. Another goal of litigation—the 
right of individual litigants to be heard—is sacrificed when parties lose their 
ability to bring their narratives into court, to have those narratives heard and 
considered by a decisionmaker. Moreover, when narrative-erasing procedure 
takes hold, future litigants’ abilities to tell their own stories are sorely limited.  
Narrative theory also provides a way to look at the particular threats of nar-
rative-erasing procedure. Specifically, scholars of law and narrative have con-
sidered the consequences for the legal system when particular narratives are not 
raised in formal court proceedings.219 This article extends these insights to the 
consequences of erasing narratives from litigation prior to trial.  
When procedural and substantive rules and common practice all permit the 
expression of narratives, those narratives become the common property of the 
                                                        
214   Spencer has argued that a “restrictive ethos” in civil procedure has led to “many rules 
being developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the ability of claimants 
to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal court.” Spencer, su-
pra note 8, at 353–54; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive 
Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 188–89 (2010). 
215   Spencer, supra note 8, at 370. 
216   Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1822–23 (2015) (noting 
that “the shifting civil litigation presumptions have also resulted in higher (and sometimes 
insurmountable) barriers to marginalized individuals,” resulting in “certain kinds of claims 
[being] lost.”); Spencer, supra note 8, at 371 (noting the particular effects of restrictive pro-
cedure on including cases involving fraud, malicious prosecution, civil rights, securities, an-
titrust, and employment discrimination); see also id. at 370 (explaining that “[c]ivil proce-
dure tends to favor the interests of” a commercial class by, among other things, “protecting 
commercial defendants against claims by members of various out-groups”). 
217   See, e.g., Dana Shocair Reda, What Does It Mean to Say That Procedure Is Political?, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2203, 2222 (2017) (“Discovery rules are and will be policy determina-
tions. . . .”); Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemak-
ing Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 71 (2010) (“Procedure is substance.”). 
218   Coleman, supra note 2, at 503 (“[T]he price of a restrictive shift in procedural doctrine is 
that it marginalizes particular claims, and by extension, particular people.”). 
219   See Ferguson, supra note 114, at 87 (asking “[w]hat, in effect, happens when a relevant 
story is actively repressed in a republic of laws?”). 
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legal system: “[A] relevant story that is effectively told belongs to the republic 
of laws for ready use. . . . Ideologically, it remains available to everyone.”220 
But when narratives are excluded from law, the equivalent of psychological re-
pression occurs.221 Like psychologically repressed information, repressed narra-
tive in the law does not go away.222 Erased narratives can return to “haunt” the 
law, both as a “cultural narrative” and as a “renewed legal event.”223 
Yet while they are repressed, erased narratives cannot be used, effectively 
holding up the law’s progress.224 Neglecting law’s narrative content can also 
result in ignoring “individual and social responsibility.”225 Thus, “[t]he price of 
repression in a republic of laws can be very high.”226 Ultimately, the law’s de-
velopment suffers when narratives are erased. 
A. Three Instances of Narrative-Erasing Procedure  
In recent years, we have seen the concerning rise of what is best described 
as narrative-erasing procedure in civil pretrial litigation. This section will dis-
cuss three instances of narrative-erasing procedure: 1) the Supreme Court im-
posing the heightened “plausibility” pleading standard,227 2) the Rules Advisory 
Committee altering the discovery rules to further emphasize “proportionality” 
in discovery requests,228 and 3) settlement pressures increasing at every stage of 
pretrial litigation.229 
1. The Plausibility Pleading Standard 
The motion to dismiss, which in the Twombly/Iqbal era is judged against 
the “plausibility standard,”230 is a form of narrative-erasing procedure. Prior to 
Twombly, civil complaints were judged against Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the longstanding Conley standard, which provided that “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
                                                        
220   Id. at 96. 
221   Id. at 88. 
222   Rather, it takes on the form of “something secretly familiar that has undergone repression 
and then returned to consciousness all of a sudden in sometimes frightening and recurring 
patterns.” Id. at 89. 
223   Id. at 88, 97. 
224   Id. at 97 (“The law does not get beyond what it has not worked through.”). 
225  WEST, supra note 9, at 427 (“[O]ne of the dangers of a society that relies . . . insufficient-
ly on narrative, is that it may be dangerously inattentive to the very real need to assign and 
then acknowledge both individual and societal responsibility for the consequences of ac-
tions.”). 
226   Ferguson, supra note 114, at 96. 
227   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
556 (2007). 
228   Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 305 F.R.D. 457 (2015). 
229   See Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 
EMORY L.J. 1491, 1512 (2016); see also Clermont, supra note 5, at 1956. 
230   Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
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beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief.”231 The Conley rule was understood to reflect 
the desires of the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
pleading—and all of litigation—to be governed by rules that were “simple, uni-
form, and transsubstantive.”232 
Then in 2007, the Supreme Court, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, initi-
ated a revolution in pleading practice.233 The Court held that, for an antitrust 
claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim “requires a complaint with enough factual 
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”234 In other 
words, the Court was “[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement.”235 
The plausibility standard, it emphasized, “calls for enough fact to raise a rea-
sonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”236  
In Iqbal, the Court confirmed that the “plausibility” standard applies to all 
cases governed by Rule 8.237 The Court further explained the plausibility stand-
ard, writing that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads fac-
tual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the de-
fendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”238 Only “well-pleaded factual 
allegations” would be considered by a court to “determine whether [the allega-
tions in a complaint] plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”239 Put dif-
ferently, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 
by mere conclusory statements” would not be enough to establish a claim’s 
plausibility.240 
Twombly and Iqbal spawned a decade’s worth of scholarship criticizing the 
plausibility standard. As relevant to this article’s concerns, some argue that 
courts, by trying to screen out meritless litigation through granting motions to 
dismiss, can hold up the law’s progression.241 Others have noted that the 
heightened motion to dismiss standard presented by plausibility pleading is un-
                                                        
231   Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
232  Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 556 (2002). 
233  See, e.g., Benjamin P. Cooper, Iqbal’s Retro Revolution, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 937, 
939 (2011). 
234  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
235  Id. 
236  Id. 
237  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
238  Id. 
239  Id. at 679. 
240  Id. at 678. 
241  See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Liti-
gation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1232 (2014). 
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democratic, in part because it frustrates congressional intent embodied in stat-
utes designed to “enable private enforcement of important social norms.”242 
The plausibility standard has influenced the grants of motions to dismiss: 
“dismissal rates have increased significantly post-Iqbal.”243 Most troublingly, 
perhaps, a 12(b)(6) motion is more likely to be granted in cases where plaintiffs 
are least likely to have access at the pleading stage to the kind of information 
that makes a claim plausible. The plausibility standard has had a particularly 
negative effect on civil rights plaintiffs, and some evidence shows that motions 
to dismiss in civil rights cases may be decided differently depending on the 
race of the plaintiff and/or the race of the judge.244 
I have written, as have others, about the way the plausibility standard artic-
ulated in Twombly and Iqbal can be read as a call for more storytelling in 
pleading.245 Even if the litigant heeds advice to “tell a story” in pleading, with 
factual detail, character, and scene, the amorphous and ill-defined plausibility 
standard leads to narrative erasure by courts.  
First, at the pleading stage, plaintiffs may not have access to full infor-
mation about the underlying story—events, actions, and entities involved—that 
would allow them to construct a rich, plausible narrative. The motion to dismiss 
post-Twombly and Iqbal is problematic in part because it allows the party in 
possession of all the factual details to attack the other side for not having a 
plausible narrative.246 The higher hurdle that the plausibility standard poses also 
                                                        
242  See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring A 
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 405 (2011) (describing four 
ways the Twombly and Iqbal decisions function as an attack on American democracy). 
243  Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 
2117, 2121 (2015). Reinert found that a case being decided post-Iqbal “is highly correlated 
with an increase in the likelihood that a case (or the majority of the claims challenged by 
motion) will be dismissed.” Id. at 2157. 
244  See id. (“The increased rate of dismissal [was] more pronounced for particular kinds of 
cases (employment discrimination, civil rights, and financial instruments), [and] particular 
kinds of claimants (individual). . . . ”); see also Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common 
Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5, 40 (2011) (finding, post-Iqbal, statistically significant increases in 
dismissal of African-American plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination in the workplace and 
of similar claims from African-American pro se plaintiffs, and finding a “marginally signifi-
cant trend” showing white and African-American judges apply Iqbal differently). Quintanilla 
concluded that application of Twombly and Iqbal have resulted in “increased dismissals of 
Black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination,” suggesting that it “is likely that the same 
natural psychological processes that disadvantage Blacks are operating against other stereo-
typed groups at the pleading stage.” Id. at 60. 
245  Ralph, supra note 167, at 57; see also Fajans & Falk, supra note 167, at 4. 
246  See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Mo-
tion to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 446 (2013) (“The Court has now created a species 
of factual inquiry in which one side has the burden of establishing a factual threshold while 
the other is free to critique it without proffering its own factual claims.”). As Issacharoff and 
Miller write, trials present “a confrontation between competing accounts of the relevant 
facts” and even summary judgment allows claims to be tested “against a completed discov-
ery record.” Id. 
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limits narratives that can develop later in a case. Increased granting of motions 
to dismiss deprives the system of narratives that could be developed and of ad-
vances in the law.247 
Second, judges applying the plausibility standard may rely on their existing 
narrative schema and cognitive biases.248 Given the privileged position of judg-
es, who tend to be well educated and politically elite,249 the plausibility stand-
ard may invite them to unconsciously apply a master-narrative that differs radi-
cally from the narratives that civil rights plaintiffs and members of 
marginalized groups may wish to tell.  
Third, the higher plausibility standard may also force plaintiffs into exist-
ing narratives to demonstrate their claim’s plausibility, rather than working cre-
atively to develop a path-breaking narrative of liability in a claim. Legal narra-
tives that have already been recognized as plausible—or better yet, that have 
already led to relief on the merits—will cast a long “shadow.”250 Plaintiffs who 
have a pre-approved narrative available may find that narrative a safer bet and 
may forgo novel legal theories. Plausibility forces parties into set pathways that 
become ossified.251 At the 12(b)(6) stage, courts read a complaint for whether it 
states a plausible claim; but the court decides this, not only on its own reading 
of the complaint, but also on the briefing of the parties. Both in pleading deci-
sions and in motion to dismiss preparation, the framing effects of the plausibil-
ity standard mean that parties’ worlds and narrative possibilities are narrowed, 
forcing them early to focus on what may yet be proved.  
Even parties who can survive a motion to dismiss still may find themselves 
limited in the narratives that they can develop through discovery and at sum-
                                                        
247  See Coleman, supra note 2, at 502 (describing how “our collective legal consciousness 
would be impoverished if . . . plaintiffs [in seminal civil rights cases] had never had their 
paradigmatic day in court” due to heightened pleading standards). 
248  As Reinert has explained, judges assessing plausibility are not immune from cognitive 
bias. See Reinert, supra note 8, at 1786 (“When judges attempt to evaluate the merits of a 
claim, cognitive biases may taint their assessment. . . .”); see also Mitchell F. Crusto, Em-
pathic Dialogue: From Formalism to Value Principles, 65 SMU L. REV. 845, 850 (2012) 
(“[J]udges who focus on their umpire role may fail to consider how their unconscious biases 
affect their decisions and the litigants themselves.”); Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the 
Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive Science Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 278, 299–300 (2014) (“[R]ecent studies have demonstrated 
that even the most qualified judges may rely on intuitive thought processes, resulting in 
judgment that is flawed with systemic errors.”). 
249  See Spencer, supra note 214, at 197. 
250  In essence, plaintiffs who worry about facing a “plausibility” motion to dismiss find 
themselves pleading “in the shadow of the law.” See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 
997 (1979). 
251  See Reinert, supra note 241, at 1233 (noting that restrictive procedure “prevents litigants 
from engaging in the kind of factual discovery that can prompt future changes in legal 
rules. . . . [A]s cases are dismissed at earlier and earlier procedural stages, the announcement 
of relevant legal rules inevitably will be more generalized and less tailored to specific factual 
scenarios, thus depriving future litigants of meaningful guidance.”). 
18 NEV. L.J. 573, RALPH - FINAL 3/28/18  11:10 AM 
Winter 2018] NARRATIVE-ERASING PROCEDURE 613 
mary judgment, by virtue of having framed the narrative in a particular way at 
the pleading stage to achieve plausibility.  
In the face of the plausibility standard and the higher hurdle of a motion to 
dismiss post-Twombly and Iqbal, it is likely that some litigants are dissuaded 
from ever initiating a lawsuit. There is no way to measure the impact of the ab-
sence of narratives that are never even whispered in a lawsuit.252 
2. Proportional Discovery  
If a plaintiff makes it past the motion-to-dismiss phase, she faces another 
hurdle: proportional discovery under the recently revised Rule 26(b)(1), another 
instance of narrative-erasing procedure. Rule 26(b)(1), which sets the scope of 
discovery, has been amended specifically to add proportionality calculus, effec-
tive December 1, 2015.253 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to be transsubstantive 
and assure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of claims.254 They are 
also supposed to treat cases equally.255 But as Paul Stancil has noted recently, 
the “formal equality” promoted by the transsubstantive rules does not actually 
support substantive equality or procedural justice, and produces “predictably 
unjust outcomes in many categories of cases.”256 The concept of transsubstan-
tivity in procedure fails to take into account the growth of federal private rights 
of action, including in the civil rights context, and the extent of information 
disparities between parties in particular cases.257 The substantive inequality the 
rules produce has significant effects on narrative. One example of this is the re-
cent move to include “proportionality” in the definition of discoverable infor-
mation in Rule 26(b)(1).  
Prior to the 2015 amendments, the language of Rule 26(b)(1) defined the 
scope of discovery as follows: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense. . . .”258 
With the proportionality language added to Rule 26(b)(1), the scope of discov-
                                                        
252  Even meritless litigation can have salutary consequences for development of the law. Id. 
at 1235 (“[M]eritless litigation can . . . prompt legal change, or provoke a broader discussion 
of legal norms.”). 
253  Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 305 F.R.D. 457 (2015). 
254  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
255  See Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1633, 
1690 (2017) (“[T]he decision to employ formally equal transsubstantive procedure seems to 
have been based upon the erroneous assumption that all federal civil cases were and always 
would be sufficiently ‘like’ along the relevant dimensions to justify a formally equal ap-
proach.”). 
256  Id. at 1635; see also id. at 1649 (“[A] procedurally just system must strike the appropriate 
balance among three potentially competing ends: accuracy, cost, and meaningful participa-
tion rights. These foundations of procedural justice are inconsistent with the formal equality 
norm embodied in the current transsubstantive rules.”). 
257  Id. at 1665, 1672–74. 
258  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (amended 2015). 
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ery is now as follows: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivi-
leged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to 
the needs of the case,” with proportionality determined by weighing “the im-
portance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the par-
ties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the im-
portance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”259 Though 
proportionality is not new to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, its inclusion 
in the scope of discovery is novel.260 
The addition of “proportionality” to the Rule 26(b)(1) definition of the 
scope of discovery grew out of a 2010 conference at Duke where participants 
concluded discovery had become too burdensome.261 Accordingly, the Duke 
Conference Subcommittee developed proposed amendments to Rule 26 that 
were approved by the Advisory Committee and Standing Committee and sub-
mitted to the Judicial Conference for adoption by the Supreme Court.262  
The move to include proportionality in the scope of discovery was not 
without objections. Objections to adding proportionality included: that it would 
favor only defendants, that it was subjective and could not be uniformly ap-
plied, and that it would defeat claims like employment and civil rights where 
plaintiffs labored under information asymmetry relative to defendants who 
were likely to possess all important information.263 
                                                        
259  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
260  The concept of “proportionality” has been a part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
since 1983. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097, 1103–04 
(1983). Most recently, the proportionality standard and the factors that influence proportion-
ality were part of Rule 26(b)(2)(c). See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(ii). 
261  ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT OF THE DUKE CONFERENCE SUBCOMMITTEE, 
82–84 (2014). See also Reda, supra note 217, at 2208 (“The 2015 amendments were animat-
ed by ongoing concerns over the cost and delay of discovery.”); Elizabeth Thornburg, Cog-
nitive Bias, the “Band of Experts,” and the Anti-Litigation Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 
755, 758 (2016) (“The Advisory Committee claims that the 2015 discovery amendments 
arise out of the ‘Duke Conference,’ . . . at which panels addressed assumed issues of cost and 
delay. . . . But . . . the Duke Conference itself resulted, in part, from ongoing pressure from 
corporate America to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in ways that make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to succeed.”). 
262  ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 261, at 79. The Subcommittee did recom-
mend withdrawal of recommendations that would reduce the number of depositions, inter-
rogatories, and requests to admit and that would reduce deposition length from seven to six 
hours. Id. 
263  Id. at 81. Summarizing the comments on the Rule 26 amendments, the Center for Consti-
tutional Litigation concluded that the majority of legal academics and current and former 
federal judges opposed it. Letter from Valerie M. Nannery, Senior Litig. Couns., Ctr. for 
Const. Litig., to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Civ. Rules Advisory Comm. 2–3 (Apr. 9, 
2014). Opponents of the change to Rule 26 argued that adding proportionality to 26(b)(1) 
would elevate cost-benefit analysis to a position “co-equal to relevance” in discovery. CTR. 
FOR CONST. LITIG., Preliminary Report on Comments on Proposed Changes to Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 19 (2014). Objectors also argued the change would “creates classes of 
litigants, based on their resources and the amount in controversy, providing less discovery to 
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Nonetheless, the Subcommittee concluded that the change to include pro-
portionality should be made. Although the “proportionality” language and ele-
ments were not new, moving the language into Rule 26(b)(1) no doubt reflected 
an attempt to satisfy the long-stated desire to “improve[]” discovery.264 Chief 
Justice Roberts announced the changes in his 2015 Year End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary, explained that the amendment to Rule 26 would place “rea-
sonable limits on discovery” by relying on “common[]sense.”265  
Since the inclusion of proportionality in the scope of discovery, scholars 
have noted that the rule changes reflect the biases of lawyers who practice in 
corporate defense and complex litigation, including a mistaken belief that the 
costs of discovery are too high.266 However, empirical evidence showed that in 
most cases, discovery costs were “both modest and proportional.”267 Scholars 
have also noted that the revised standard will take time to understand and, in 
the meantime, will lead to discovery battles.268 Battles over the new standard 
will also increase discovery costs.269  
In addition to increasing costs and uncertainty, defining discovery in terms 
of proportionality threatens to obstruct narrative development of cases. Narra-
tives are what grow the law, and events—constituent events and supplementary 
events, to use the language of narrative theorists—are what populate narratives. 
Thus, parties need access to information, gained through discovery, to develop 
narratives. As I have described, discovery enables future narratives in a case by 
translating events into the world of the lawsuit that are available for future 
treatments. Robust discovery enables narrative development, while restrictions 
on discovery limit the kinds of stories that can be told in a case.  
As well, from a narrative standpoint, the problem with the proportional ap-
proach is that sometimes it is impossible to tell what is unnecessary or wasteful 
                                                                                                                                 
(and thus less protection of the rights of) those with fewer resources and low or no monetary 
damages.” Id. at 23. 
264  Indeed, the Subcommittee report concluded that “transferring the [former] Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) factors to the scope of discovery” would “constitute a significant improve-
ment to the rules governing discovery.” ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 261, 
at 82. The Subcommittee also concluded that the change to include proportionality in 
26(b)(1) allowed “more proportional discovery” which would “decrease the cost of resolving 
disputes in federal court without sacrificing fairness.” Id. at 84–85. 
265  U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 4, at 6. Chief Justice Roberts’s Report reflects a skepti-
cism of discovery’s necessity: “I cannot believe that many members of the bar went to law 
school because of a burning desire to spend their professional life wearing down opponents 
with creatively burdensome discovery requests[.]” Id. at 11. 
266  See Coleman, supra note 152, at 1017; Thornburg, supra note 261, at 759. 
267  Thornburg, supra note 261, at 759. 
268  Some scholars have suggested the proportionality amendments make no substantive 
changes to discovery. See, e.g., Andrew S. Pollis, Busting Up the Pretrial Industry, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2097, 2105–06 (2017). Others have argued that proportionality is appro-
priate. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 242, at 401. 
269  Pollis, supra note 268, at 2106; see also id. at 2099 (“[J]udges have made it virtually im-
possible for parties with legitimate grievances but limited resources to have their day in 
court, especially against wealthier adversaries.”). 
18 NEV. L.J. 573, RALPH - FINAL 3/28/18  11:10 AM 
616 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:573  
until after the fact. In reality, the proportionality factors such as “the im-
portance of the discovery in resolving the issues”270 are not always obvious; a 
telling detail may not appear valuable before it is discovered. Although events 
appear to have a teleological orientation when written into a narrative such as a 
summary judgment brief, at the time the story-events are still being developed 
through discovery, there is no way for the parties (or the court) to know which 
events are truly the constituent events on which the ultimate narrative depends, 
and which events are only supplementary, non-essential, events.  
These amendments, with their professed underlying concerns about effi-
ciency and waste, can give judges cover to limit discovery and narrative. The 
same narrative schema and cognitive biases that may affect judges’ sense of 
plausibility also threaten to affect their judgment of proportionality. The factors 
weighed in determining proportionality, which include “the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues,” invite subjectivity. Proportionality can also 
give well-resourced parties the ability to drive up the costs of discovery in a 
quest to pinpoint the imprecise notion of proportionality.271 This would dis-
courage claims and further repress narratives. In short, limiting discovery to on-
ly what is “proportional” will have a negative effect on narrative at the pretrial 
stage. 
3. Settlement 
As Owen Fiss argued more than thirty years ago in “Against Settlement,” 
increasing rates of settlement in civil trials means that numerous democratic 
values are threatened.272 He wrote that settlement is “the civil analogue of plea 
bargaining: Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone 
without authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judi-
cial involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may 
not be done.”273  
 
                                                        
270  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014) (identifying list of factors to be considered when 
determining proportionality of discovery). 
271  See, e.g., David M. Katz, Assessing the Federal Rules’ Proportionality Amendment: Why 
Proportionality Is Philosophically Proper, Yet Practically Problematic, 67 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 583, 599 (2017) (predicting that the proportionality amendment will lead to a “whole 
track of discovery motion practice”). 
272  Fiss, supra note 213, at 1085. See also Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful 
Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Proce-
dure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 306–07 (2013) (expressing “increasing[] concern[s]” over ris-
ing rates of settlement because trial is “an important aspect of our democratic tradition, and 
preserve[s] the credibility of our civil justice system.”). 
273  Fiss, supra note 213, at 1075. 
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Fiss’s concerns remain relevant today. There is a robust debate on the de-
sirability of settlement.274 And statistics on settlement are difficult to gauge.275 
But there is understanding that settlement is the dominant method of civil case 
disposition,276 and that judicial involvement in settlement may create undue 
pressure on a party.277 The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has also trans-
formed arbitration, leading to increased challenges for “diffuse consumers, 
workers, and citizens attempting to deal with concentrated corporate power.”278  
Consider how settlement and other forms of alternative dispute resolution 
affect the narrative population of the civil justice system. When a case settles, 
particularly before summary judgment briefing, the contest of narratives phase 
is lost. The narrative contest is avoided: the two narratives that would have du-
eled are erased, and with them the fodder for later narratives, for instance, on 
appeal. None of the supporting materials that can be used in narrative construc-
tion come to light, either. Specific details that make a rich legal narrative dis-
appear. Further, many settlements are sealed.279 
A settled case means no trial-level weighing that results in a narrative-
containing opinion; no trial-level opinion means that no narratives from the 
case will eventually filter up to higher courts for narrative-weighing. No demo-
cratic branch of government hears the narratives about how law applies in a 
particular situation.  
The rise of settlement affects not only the narrative in cases that settle—it 
affects narratives developed in non-settled cases and the narrative population of 
the civil legal system generally. As pressures on parties to settle increase, and 
as involved judicial management of settlement discussion becomes the norm, 
the way parties approach narrative construction in cases will change. If parties 
calculate that settlement is likely, they may choose not to develop the story-
events of an eventual narrative; in other words, narrative details may never be 
                                                        
274  See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2663 (1995) (de-
scribing the “polarized debate about how disputes should be resolved”). 
275  See Clermont, supra note 5, at 1953 (noting that “we do not know much about the actual-
ities of settlement. . . . It is obvious, nevertheless, that the settlement rate is high.”). 
276  See id. at 1956. 
277  See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. 
L. REV. 319, 339 (2008) (“Judges pressure settlement in individual cases and do so without 
much concern about a party’s day in court.”); Blake D. Morant, The Declining Prevalence of 
Trials as a Dispute Resolution Device: Implications for the Academy, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1123, 1127 (2012) (“While settlement conferences are often voluntary, judges can exert 
extreme pressure that encourages parties to settle their disputes.”). 
278  Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 462, 528 
(2017). 
279  Generally, settlement is seen as reducing narratives. Judith Resnik, supra note 192, at 
1818 (“[S]ome courts permit sealing [of settlements] . . . Moreover, stipulations of dismissal 
need not include underlying agreements.”). Some scholars have recognized that certain set-
tlements, appropriately structured, can give rise to narratives. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 
106, at 1680. 
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mined at all. That lack of development of narrative ingredients can affect even 
non-settled cases, resulting in cases presented to judges and juries that have not 
had their possible narratives developed thoroughly. When a case reaches a 
judge with an impoverished narrative, the resulting opinion will fail to contrib-
ute fully to the narrative development of the law.  
B. Effects of Narrative-Erasing Procedure 
The effects of all these narrative-erasing procedures that I have described 
end up compounding one another.280 Ultimately, the function of all these narra-
tive drop-offs is that fewer and fewer narratives will ever reach summary 
judgment or trial. Even if a case survives the hurdles of narrative-erasing pro-
cedure, the case will be impoverished of narrative by the time it is ready for 
disposition by summary judgment or trial.  
If a case is barreling towards an ending in which storytelling before a ju-
ry281 or judge is not anticipated or the norm, attention to narrative details, pos-
sibility, and construction will lapse during the case’s development—a kind of 
atmospheric effect. In the contest of narratives that the parties engage in before 
the court’s decision, the parties themselves are stripped of narrative possibility. 
The burdens of plausibility pleading, the limited discovery process, and the set-
tlement pressure will have depressed the narrative content in the case. When a 
case’s narrative content is weakened, the contest of narratives in litigation is 
dulled. Accordingly, this contest ceases to be a true contest because the parties’ 
narratives have not been fully developed.  
The repression that narrative-erasing procedure creates extends beyond the 
consequences in one case. When narratives are erased in one case, both that 
case and any cases that may come after suffer. That is, cases that would have 
utilized prior-case narratives will have a shallow set of legal narratives from 
which to draw.  
Ultimately, the law suffers when procedure erases narratives. Without nar-
rative richness, the judge or finder of fact cannot make the best decision in a 
                                                        
280  See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 8, at 1785 (describing “a federal judiciary that has very little 
experience evaluating the merits of claims,” due to the combination of a decrease in trials 
and an increase in alternative dispute resolution, summary judgment, and secret settlement). 
281  Juries “hear less than one percent of civil cases in federal and state courts.” Suja A. 
Thomas, The Missing Branch of the Jury, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1261, 1262–63 (2016). Although 
the jury itself does not sanction a “winning” version of the narrative, the way a judge could 
in a trial or appellate opinion, the jury functions as an arbiter of narrative and chooses the 
winning side according to which side can tell the most convincing narrative. BURNS, supra 
note 115, at 22–26; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520 (1991). Several scholars have de-
cried the reduction in trials generally as anti-democratic and threatening to underlying Amer-
ican values. See, e.g., Burbank & Subrin, supra note 242, at 401. (“This right to be heard, the 
core of due process of law, has been integral to democratic thought and institutions at least 
since the English Magna Carta in the thirteenth century.”). 
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particular case or in the long-term life of the law.282 Narrative generally prom-
ises a richer catalog of law-stories. But without new stories or new narratives, 
new legal pathways cannot develop. Without new narratives, the law cannot 
adapt to the times to accommodate citizens.  
Narrative-erasing procedure is especially troublesome because limiting the 
entry of stories into the law has an especially powerful impact on individuals 
from marginalized groups. The effectiveness of storytelling for bringing outsid-
er perspectives into the law and the courtroom is well recognized.283 The same 
concerns that gave rise to the legal storytelling movement in the 1980s and 
1990s—namely, a need for women and people of color to be heard telling sto-
ries about their experiences at the hands of the law—still exist today. Because 
as a group judges are highly educated and very often members of a political or 
social elite, they may not share the same “stock stories” with the litigants from 
outsider groups who appear before them. But we know narratives can create 
empathy and persuade in a way that cold logic or impersonal data cannot.  
Narrative-erasing procedure hampers the ability of litigants from marginal-
ized groups to develop narratives that would increase empathy from the judge 
or jury, create cross-cultural communication, and ultimately result in greater 
understanding. Those repressed legal narratives do not simply disappear—they 
reappear as repeated cries for justice. Law’s openness to multiple stories has 
been recognized as a structural feature, one with profound democratic implica-
tions.284 When the civil justice system’s procedures close out narratives, its 
very authority is at risk. 
Finally, erasing narrative from litigation is concerning because the practice 
robs litigants of a chance to truly be heard. Our American legal system embod-
ies the idea of the “right to be heard” and erasing narratives chips away at that 
right.  
What has driven these changes to “narrative-erasing procedure”? Scholars 
have put forth a number of theories, including data-driven efficiency285 and 
capture of the courts by a class of wealthy corporate litigants.286 In addition to 
these causes, the rise of narrative-erasing procedure may be motivated by law’s 
                                                        
282  “Today’s opinion, making law, is tomorrow’s precedent; taken as a whole, a string of 
opinions represent a collective effort to come to terms with a problem of legal judgment in 
varying contexts.” WHITE, supra note 87, at 89. 
283  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412–14 (1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Crit-
ical Legal Studies and Reparation, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323–26 (1987). 
284  See WHITE, supra note 87, at 174. 
285  Coleman has argued that a commitment to data-driven efficiency has pushed the civil 
litigation system to favor non-trial resolution of cases and to be skeptical of plaintiffs. Cole-
man, supra note 216, at 1778. She has also argued that efficiency is too often associated with 
a focus on “simple costs,” while ignoring “a comprehensive set of costs that, although more 
difficult to quantify, are critical to an accurate measure of efficiency.” Id. 
286  Coleman has argued that procedural cases that benefit what she calls “the one percent” of 
elite litigators and their clients have influenced the law to change in a way that does not 
serve most of the parties engaged in civil litigation. See Coleman, supra note 152, at 1062. 
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general anti-narrative bias. Even if these changes can be ascribed to an attitude 
of benign neglect in the context of attempts to deal with caseloads in federal 
courts and the threat of baseless litigation, perhaps rule-makers and courts 
failed to consider the changes’ effects on narrative because they are accus-
tomed to ignoring narrative’s presence in the law. Put simply, narrative-erasing 
procedure may be going unquestioned because no one is bothering to look.  
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF NARRATIVE-ERASING PROCEDURE 
To properly value pretrial narratives and to combat this dangerous phe-
nomenon of narrative of narrative-erasing procedure, lawyers, courts, and 
scholars should first recognize the function and value of pretrial narratives, as 
described above. This article also makes several recommendations to combat 
narrative-erasing procedure. Some of these recommendations call for action 
within the existing structures of the legal system and are a natural fit for law-
yers, scholars, judges, and rule-makers. The article’s final recommendation 
calls for lawyers and scholars to engage in narrative advocacy outside the court 
to expand the stock stories available for narrative use in pretrial litigation.  
A. Within the Legal System: Advocating for Narrative  
For lawyers, judges, and scholars concerned about the effects of narrative-
erasing procedure, I propose a number of solutions to be pursued while acting 
within the traditional roles of lawyers and judges.  
 First, advocates, as part of their ethical duties to advance the law and the 
cause of justice, should use narrative in representation decisions wherever pos-
sible.287 This advice is already put into practice by many excellent advocates, 
and is already advised by scholars of persuasion and advocacy.288 Moreover, 
advocates should explicitly highlight the value of narrative when making pro-
cedural arguments. For instance, when arguing a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim, the plaintiff’s counsel could argue to the court that a variety of 
narrative frames could be applied to the plaintiff’s factual assertions in the 
complaint—essentially de-biasing the court by pointing out the way narrative 
                                                        
287  BURNS, supra note 115, at 38–39 (noting that what a lawyer may tell about her case are 
limited by ethical rules, the need to maintain the credibility of the client’s story, and the need 
to account for/accommodate other information that may arise in the case). 
288  Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of 
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 867 (1992) (“prescib[ing] 
awareness of universalized [poverty] narratives and how lawyers should receive and trans-
late client stories”); JoNel Newman, Identity and Narrative: Turning Oppression into Client 
Empowerment in Social Security Disability Cases, 79 ALB. L. REV. 373, 374 (2016) (encour-
aging lawyers to “focus on client narratives” when representing individuals with disabilities). 
See also sources cited supra note 148. 
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might be affecting him or her unconsciously. Legal scholars can also educate 
judges about the value of narrative.289 
Second, I recommend that courts and rule-makers explicitly take narrative 
into account when altering procedural standards, and that courts adopt a narra-
tive lens in even seemingly procedural decisions. Narrative-erasing procedures 
should only be adopted after explicitly considering the consequences for narra-
tive and determining that the procedural change’s benefits outweigh the poten-
tial justice-promoting values of narrative.  
These entities should explicitly consider how their choices, embodied in 
decisions and rules, would affect the narratives that can be developed in pretrial 
litigation. In addition to other recognized policy goals like economic efficiency, 
the entities involved in making rules for pretrial litigation should promote the 
policy goal of encouraging narratives to flourish in the pretrial setting. Respon-
sible entities include the U.S. Judicial Conference, its Standing Committee, and 
advisory committees.290 In addition, the Supreme Court and lower courts issue 
decisions through the common law process that affect pretrial procedure and 
the development of narrative prior to trial.291  
For instance, a court considering a decision that would affect pleading, or a 
rule-making body drafting a rule that would affect discovery, should weigh in 
its consideration questions such as: Will this rule demand a narrative that is 
                                                        
289  For examples of scholars highlighting the need for new narratives in particular kinds of 
cases, see Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 115 (2008) (noting that, although most “lawyers 
organize their cases around . . . stock characters and stories, seeking to situate their clients’ 
narratives within the skeletons of past successes,” a change in narrative and the resulting 
“failure to conform can be disastrous for litigants.”); Keyes, supra note 203, at 211 (explor-
ing “the complicated, multilayered ways in which . . . societal narratives about immigrants 
arise in immigration decisions and affect the exercise of discretion.”). 
290  Under federal law, the United States Supreme Court has “the power to prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district 
courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2011). The Court has delegated the work of the rulemaking pro-
cess to committees of the Judicial Conference, the national policy-making body of the feder-
al courts; the Judicial Conference “prescribe[s] and publish[es] the procedures for the con-
sideration of proposed rules.” Id. § 2073(a)(1). The Judicial Conference’s rulemaking 
activities are overseen by its Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (also known as 
its “[S]tanding [C]ommittee”). Id. § 2073(b). Further, the Judicial Conference is authorized 
to, and does, appoint advisory committees to “recommend[] rules to be prescribed” by the 
Standing Committee. Id. § 2073(a)(2). The Standing Committee reviews recommendations 
of the advisory committees and “recommend[s] to the Judicial Conference rules of practice, 
procedure, and evidence and such changes in rules . . . as may be necessary to maintain con-
sistency and otherwise promote the interest of justice.” Id. § 2073(b). The Standing Commit-
tee holds open meetings, invites public comments, and issues written reports. See, e.g., 
Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemak-
ing, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 279 (2009). 
291  See Stancil, supra note 255, at 1647 (noting that the Supreme Court “fulfills an ostensi-
bly interstitial interpretive role, providing guidance and clarification as to the meaning and 
application of the” Federal Rules, making it “doubly appropriate to include the Court in the 
list of rulemakers involved in the process.”). 
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more detailed or consistent than a party with a successful claim might be able 
to narrate at this point in a case? Will this rule force litigants into existing mas-
ter-narratives, thereby either prejudicing a party due to the master-narrative’s 
resonance, or foreclosing the opportunities to tell new stories and develop the 
law? Does this rule limit the kinds of stories that can be told later on in the 
case? More broadly, in making pretrial decisions, judges should also consider 
the effect on their judging of the master-narratives that are familiar to them. 
Considering the effect of master-narratives, a judge would weigh concerns such 
as whether the judge’s experiences and his or her set of received stock stories 
might affect openness to a party’s narrative.  
Adopting this recommendation would require a paradigm shift for courts 
and rule-makers. Courts, for instance, do not often consider the effects of their 
decisions on narrative. However, in one instance, the Supreme Court has at-
tended to the narrative consequences of one of its decisions—resulting in an 
opinion that demonstrates the kind of consideration that courts should be giving 
to narrative.292  
Old Chief v. United States asked whether a defendant could concede a prior 
conviction for the record, or whether, on the other hand, the trial court could 
refuse the defendant’s offer and allow the prosecution to present evidence of 
the full record of the prior judgment.293 In Old Chief, Justice Souter, writing for 
the Court, held that refusing to permit the defendant to stipulate to his convic-
tion would be an abuse of discretion in any case “in which the prior conviction 
is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground.”294  
Justice Souter’s opinion clearly considered the effect that evidence of the 
prior conviction would have on the case’s narratives. The opinion noted that 
“making a case with testimony and tangible things not only satisfies the formal 
definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive richness.”295 
A piece of evidence, such as the fact of a prior conviction, “has force beyond 
any linear scheme of reasoning, and as [multiple] pieces come together a narra-
tive gains momentum . . . ”296 Souter recognized that the “persuasive power of 
the concrete and particular” is important to allowing the jury to construct a ho-
listic narrative of the facts of the case; generalizations are typically not persua-
sive because a “syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom 
may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it.”297 
                                                        
292  See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191–92 (1997); see also Brooks, supra 
note 2, at 21 (describing Old Chief as the “only” instance “in which the Supreme Court 
overtly recognizes what one might call the legal stakes of narrative in adjudication.”); John 
B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A Proposal for Reform, 53 
DRAKE L. REV. 599, 610 (2005) (analyzing Old Chief as using “narrative theory as a frame-
work to understand an aspect of the legal system (here, a jury trial)”). 
293  Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174. 
294  Id. at 191. 
295  Id. at 187. 
296  Id. 
297  Id. at 189. 
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Having considered the narrative power of evidence, the opinion concluded 
that the Rules excluded evidence of the prior conviction, and that such exclu-
sion does not unduly hamper the prosecution’s ability to create a coherent nar-
rative: “Proving status without telling exactly why that status was imposed 
leaves no gap in the story . . . , and its demonstration by stipulation . . . neither 
displaces a chapter from a continuous sequence of conventional evidence nor 
comes across as an officious substitution . . .”298 Souter’s opinion thereby im-
plied that direct evidence would have told a narrative too powerful to be per-
mitted by the Rules of Evidence. Thus, there would be no countervailing narra-
tive that could overcome the prejudice created by the jury learning the 
particulars of Old Chief’s prior conviction.299 
Similarly, in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., the Seventh Circuit explained its 
decision’s effects on narrative when reversing the grant of a motion to dismiss 
under the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard.300 In Swanson, a plaintiff alleg-
ing fraud and discrimination in violation of several statutes, including the Fair 
Housing Act, appealed the grant of a motion to dismiss.301 Writing for the 
court, Judge Wood explained that the plausibility standard required “that the 
plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to pre-
sent a story that holds together. In other words, the court will ask it-
self could these things have happened, not did they happen.”302 Judge Wood 
characterized the court’s holding in terms of the narrative that the operative 
procedural rule required from plaintiffs. Although the Seventh Circuit did not 
announce a new procedural standard, the court’s reference to narrative still il-
lustrates how a court can explain a procedural ruling in narrative terms.303 
The Old Chief and Swanson decisions are models for other courts consider-
ing procedural decisions that will have effects on narrative. Rule-makers, too, 
can take guidance from those models. When rule-makers and courts consider 
the effects of their procedural decisions on pretrial narratives, they can ensure 
that decisions properly reflect the value of narrative in pretrial litigation.304  
                                                        
298  Id. at 191. 
299  See Brooks, supra note 2, at 23 (“Souter appears to recognize what a few scholars within 
and without the legal academy have argued, that the law’s general assumption that it solves 
cases with legal tools of reason and analysis that have no need for a narrative analysis could 
be mistaken.”). 
300  Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). 
301  Id. at 402–03. 
302  Id. at 404. 
303  See Ralph, supra note 167, at 47 (explaining that opinion in Swanson called for com-
plaints that embody narrative characteristics such as “narrative coherence—a story that holds 
together—and narrative correspondence—could the story have happened, does this represent 
an understanding about the way the world works”). 
304  Justice processes can change “within a society as functions of time and circumstance,” 
and “for justice to have meaning, it must reflect the social understandings common in a soci-
ety and it must incorporate changes in those understandings over time.” BENNETT & 
FELDMAN, supra note 115, at 21. 
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B. Outside the Legal System: Public Narrative  
In addition to encouraging rule-makers and courts to recognize the value of 
pretrial narratives, this article recommends an approach that lawyers and schol-
ars can use to combat narrative-erasing procedure: public narrative. Public nar-
rative has great promise as a tool for working in the context of difficult proce-
dural developments to incorporate the kind of narratives that help the law 
progress.  
Its name is deceptively simple: public narrative is not just telling a story in 
public. Instead, it is a model for composing a narrative. Public narrative, as de-
scribed in the work of Marshall Ganz, is a leadership art that uses storytelling 
to translate values into action.305 The practice of public narrative has long been 
a tool of community organizers and social movement leaders.306 For advocates 
and legal scholars working to combat narrative-erasing procedure, public narra-
tive is a tool that can be used in op-ed pieces, articles, books, and other public 
statements.  
A narrative that fits the model of public narrative has three components: it 
tells “a story of self, a story of us, and a story of now.”307 According to Ganz, a 
story of self is focused on an individual identity: “Telling one’s story of self is 
a way to communicate our identity, the choices that have made us who we are, 
and the values that shaped those choices—not as abstract principle, but as lived 
experience.”308 
Through the “story of us” part of the formula, the teller “link[s] individual 
threads into a common weave” by “ ‘nest[ing]’ ” the individual’s story in the 
“collective stories” of a community, a movement, or a nation.309 The “story of 
us” should sound familiar to scholars of narrative, because the concept relies on 
something like stock stories; as Ganz writes, “Our cultures are repositories of 
stories. Stories about challenges we have faced, how we stood up to them, and 
how we survived are woven into the fabric of our political culture, faith tradi-
tions, and so on. . . . We . . . weave new stories from old ones.”310 
Finally, through the “story of now” part of the formula, the teller “articu-
lates the urgent challenge to the values that we share that demands action now. 
                                                        
305  Marshall Ganz, Leading Change: Leadership, Organization, and Social Movements, in 
HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 527, 533, 537 (Nitin Nohria & Rakesh 
Khurana eds, 2010) [hereinafter Ganz, Leading Change]; see also Marshall Ganz, Public 
Narrative, Collective Action, and Power, in ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH PUBLIC OPINION: 
FROM INERTIA TO PUBLIC ACTION 273, 274 (Sina Odugbemi & Taeku Lee eds., 2011) [here-
inafter Ganz, Public Narrative]. 
306  One of Ganz’s best-known studies is of the public narrative used by the California Farm 
Worker Movement. See MARSHALL GANZ, WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS (2009). 
307  Ganz, Leading Change, supra note 305, at 540. 
308  Id. at 541; see also id. at 540–41 (“A story of self communicates the values that call one 
to action.”). 
309  Ganz, Public Narrative, supra note 305, at 285. 
310  Ganz, Leading Change, supra note 305, at 543. 
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What choice must we make? What is at risk? And where is the hope?”311 The 
story of now has “hope” as a key element, because it must offer a “credible vi-
sion of how to get from here to there.”312 
In the past, public narrative has been used primarily to galvanize public 
opinion in support of a social movement, rather than as a legal tool. But public 
narrative as described by Ganz holds promise as a tool for combatting narra-
tive-erasing procedure. Lawyers may be unfamiliar with the practice of public 
narrative. While a lawyer frequently serves as a public spokesperson for her 
client as an informal practice, she does so for the mostly tangential, if salutary, 
side effects—such as favorably influencing public opinion.313 But it is im-
portant for advocates and scholars to consider the ways that engaging in public 
narrative can directly benefit their work on behalf of their clients.  
Advocates and scholars should embrace the practice of public narrative as 
a means to achieve a primary benefit: systematic expansion to the kind of nar-
ratives available as “schema,” “stock stories” or “master narratives” for their 
clients. With a broader range of stock stories available even outside the context 
of the law, there will be a greater likelihood that the client’s narrative can fit a 
schema that can allow the client to surpass the hurdles of narrative-erasing pro-
cedure. 
While the prospect of public narrative may raise skepticism, there is evi-
dence that out-of-court narrative can have in-court effects. For instance, con-
sider Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff.314 
In Strieff, the Court held that evidence obtained after an unlawful investiga-
tory stop did not need to be excluded if, subsequent to the stop, an officer dis-
covered a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant.315 The discovery of a 
warrant attenuates the connection between the evidence and the unlawful stop 
sufficiently to overcome Fourth Amendment objections.316 
Justice Sotomayor dissented, stating her view that the Fourth Amendment 
should not permit the conclusion that “the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid 
                                                        
311  Id. at 544. 
312  Ganz, Public Narrative, supra note 305, at 287. Ganz illustrates this formula using Presi-
dent Obama’s 2004 speech to the Democratic National Convention. See id. at 282. In telling 
a “ ‘story of self,’ ” Obama focused on his father’s decision to study in America, his parents’ 
decision to marry despite prejudice, and their choice to name him “Barack,” or blessing, as a 
sign of faith in a tolerant America. Id. at 284. Obama’s “ ‘story of us’ ” concerned shared 
values: he described “choices made by the founders to begin this nation” and a long tradition 
of striving for equality, tying the audience to the shared tradition of striving for equality. Id. 
at 286. For the “ ‘story of now,’ ” Obama focused on details: stories of “specific people in 
specific places with specific problems,” using the audience’s “empathy” to remind them that 
all people have the capacity for change. Id. at 287–88. 
313  See Ronald D. Rotunda, Dealing with the Media: Ethical, Constitutional, and Practical 
Parameters, 84 ILL. B.J. 614, 614 (1996) (“Lawyers are often the most effective spokesper-
sons before the media, because we are trained as advocates.”). 
314  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
315  Id. (majority opinion). 
316  Id. at 2063. 
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parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of [an individual’s] 
Fourth Amendment rights.”317 She reasoned that the officer discovered the 
drugs in question “by exploiting his own illegal conduct”: he “illegally stopped 
[the defendant] and immediately ran a warrant check,” in a move “ ‘calculated’ 
to procure the evidence.”318 
In addition to her legal reasoning, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent contains a 
powerful testament to the potential of public narrative, which she achieved by 
citing a series of non-legal narratives in a portion of the dissent written for her-
self alone (Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent as to the other arguments) and 
which she based on her own “professional experiences.”319 
Justice Sotomayor explained that “unlawful ‘stops’ have severe conse-
quences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name.”320 She 
wrote about the arbitrariness of stops and the degradation that so often accom-
panies a stop.321 She wrote about the indignity of a search of a bag or of a per-
son.322 And she wrote about the extreme harm done to people of color by the 
knowledge that one’s “body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the vio-
lation of your rights,” “that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject 
of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.”323 
For support, she cited non-legal narratives: W.E.B. DuBois’s The Souls of 
Black Folk; James Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time; and Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Be-
tween the World and Me.324 The narratives she cited arguably meet the defini-
tion of public narrative: that is, these non-legal narratives represent the stories 
of individuals (“a story of self”) and connected them to the shared identity of 
the nation (“a story of us”), highlighting the importance of the narrative to the 
moment in which the writer was writing (“a story of now”). 
Justice Sotomayor’s Strieff dissent presents a powerful example of a way 
that narratives that do not otherwise make it into the court system—for a varie-
ty of reasons—can still influence the justice system. This example demon-
strates public narrative’s influence on a court at the highest level. This article 
proposes that public narrative can have an impact on other levels of the court 
system—even in pretrial phases of cases that affect many more citizens. Trial 
court judges may be influenced by narratives in making determinations in pre-
                                                        
317  Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
318  Id. at 2066. 
319  Id. at 2069. 
320  Id. 
321  Id. 
322  Id. at 2070 (“The officer may next ask for your consent to inspect your bag or purse 
without telling you that you can decline. Regardless of your answer, he may order you to 
stand helpless, perhaps facing a wall with your hands raised. If the officer thinks you might 
be dangerous, he may then frisk you for weapons.”) (citations and internal quotations omit-
ted). 
323  Id. at 2070–71. 
324  Id. at 2070 (citing W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903); JAMES BALDWIN, 
THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015)). 
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trial in the same way that Justice Sotomayor was conscious of narratives in 
Strieff. 
True, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent is just that—a dissent. But in the tried 
and true phrase: “ ‘Today’s dissent is tomorrow’s majority opinion.’ ”325 So-
tomayor’s  reliance on so many narratives in her dissent is a powerful statement 
about the effect that public narrative can have on preserving narrative in the 
law. 
Ultimately, the art of public narrative and its potential to influence the law 
deserves a more thorough treatment than this article can provide—it is a subject 
for another piece. But even this brief treatment of public narrative’s power, as 
evidenced by Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff, demonstrates that it deserves atten-
tion as a tool for combatting narrative erasure. 
CONCLUSION 
As scholars of law and narrative have long recognized, narrative matters to 
the life of the law; it matters to our democratic value of ensuring citizens the 
right to have their stories heard; and it matters to the law’s ability to adapt to 
changing times. Pretrial narrative practice deserves careful attention for its role 
in promoting the values that narrative supports in litigation. While recent pro-
cedural trends threaten to erase vital narratives from civil litigation, a greater 
attention to the function and value of pretrial narratives by judges, lawyers, and 
















                                                        
325  See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Les-
sons from Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260, 2262 (2013) (“The origins 
of the phrase ‘today’s dissent is tomorrow’s majority’ are obscure, but the phrase itself, a 
reference to the way in which the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence evolves and even reverses 
itself over time, is ubiquitous.”). 
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